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In the early stage of the Weapons Acquisition Process (Concept Exploration and
Concept Demonstration/Validation Phases) no exact and reliable data are available
about expected Mean Times Between Failures (MTBF) and Mean Times to Repair
(MTTR) for both the components of a new system or the new system itself. Neverthe-
less, appropriate decisions have to be made about the number of maintenance facilities
at certain military command levels, about the needed quantity of (military and/or civil-
ian) maintenance personnel, and about adequate spare stock levels at the appropriate
locations.
Wrong planning in this early stage can cause a degradation of the new system's fu-
ture availability. This is problematic especially with electronic equipment, because
maintenance personnel have to be highly specialized, and can not be replaced and re-
trained as easily as support personnel for trucks or tanks.
A decision aid for the early stages of the acquisition process is needed that offers
insight into the behavior of a multi-indenture level electronic system within a three ech-
elon maintenance system, develops alternatives for upcoming decisions, and finally pro-
vides information about sensitive factors and their possible tradeoffs, essentially used in
budgetary discussions.
The purpose of this thesis is the exact definition of all relevant factors pertaining to
the necessary decisions, the review of existing models and tools and their review for ap-
plicability. Because the modification of existing programs can not solve the whole scope
of the problem due to the use of early generation computer languages, and due to the
necessarily new and different approach to the topic, a new simulation program has to
be developed. Using object oriented simulation language MODSIM-II, first steps to-





The reader is cautioned that the computer program developed in this research
(MODSIM Definition and Implementation Modules) have not been exercised within a
complete program. While every effort has been made, within the time available, to en-
sure that the modules are free of logic errors, they are incomplete and can not be con-
sidered validated. Any application of these modules in a MODSIM-program without
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I. INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. LOGISTIC SUPPORT IN THE WEAPONS ACQUISITION PROCESS
In the Weapon Acquisition Process, both within the U.S. Armed Forces and within
the Federal Armed Forces Germany, the planning for providing sufficient and efficient
logistic support for a new weapon system begins in the early stage, in the Concept Ex-
ploration Phase and the Concept Demonstration/Validation Phase. Quantity and quality
of maintenance personnel, maintenance facilities, spare and exchange parts, storage fa-
cilities, tools, manuals and training have to be determined as early as possible, because
the lead time from planning to acceptance by budgetary commissions, from contracting
parts and tools to actual delivery', and from hiring personnel until their final ability to
repair defective equipment is nearly as long as the actual development time of the oper-
ational weapon system itself. Using the concept of Integrated Logistic Support (ILS
[Ref. 1]), this problem is addressed in the U.S.Army. Nevertheless, it is not uncommon
that military equipment is deployed to the active forces without sufficient logistic sup-
port. One reason is based on the fact that reliable data for computing necessary and
adequate quantities for logistic support facilities are not available at that point of time
they are needed.
B. SPECIAL SITUATION WITH ELECTRONIC MATERIEL
Although the personnel training problem with conventional equipment (i.e. equip-
ment based on mechanical, electrical or weapons engineering) can be managed by reas-
signing existing manpower to a new system after some time for training, this problem is
more crucial for electronic materiel. Complex and expensive equipment needs thoroughly
trained and highly specified personnel. So it is essential to avoid delays in the planning
process, caused by waiting for the availability of data. The approach developed in this
thesis concentrates on electronic equipment.
C. PRELIMINARY DECISIONS BASED ON EXPERIENCE
For computing the number of maintenance personnel for any new weapon system within
a given military maintenance structure, two equipment specific data are essential:
• Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF)
• Mean Time To Repair (MTTR)
But at that crucial point of time in the Weapons Acquisition Process, at which numbers
are needed to get started in time, no data are available about MTBF and MTTR for the
components of a new system. Even the system itself will not be defined in any precise
form. There will be functional units with defined abilities, there will be components with
a known technology, there will be first details of a redundancy concept.
But already in the first Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) at the end of the
Concept Exploration Phase, numbers for quantities are entered. Based on the knowledge
of experienced personnel, these numbers are not necessarily wrong. In fact, these initial
numbers often turn out to be pretty close to reality. But there is an inherent danger of
offering data that can not be justified. In times of economic constraints requests based
on intuition generally are not accepted by budgeteers. So the initial numbers are adjusted
to budget shortages without having any clue about the sometimes fatal consequences for
the logistic support system, just because these initial numbers can not be backed by any
kind of analysis.
D. THESIS OVERVIEW
Operations Research methods seem to be an appropriate way to resolve this situ-
ation. Formulating the given problem as a stochastic model and applying adequate es-
timation and calculation methods should offer numbers, which can be analyzed for
sensitivity about changes of all kind, and can not be rejected solely due their intuitional
origin.
In proceeding towards this goal, the following steps are performed in this thesis:
• In Chapter II, the overall problem is described. This includes a presentation of the
military environment with emphasis on the support of future electronic weapon
systems. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate both the design structure of a future electronic
system and the command structure of its area of deployment, the Federal Armed
Forces Germany. Figures 3 and 4 visualize those places in the military environ-
ment, where both structures meet - the different kinds of military maintenance fa-
cilities. Finally, all facts, rules, subtleties and interactions pertaining to the
maintenance problem are described.
• Chapter III starts with a review of published analytic models and results related to
theoretical maintenance problems. These models are either designed to solve dif-
ferent problems, or they are purely analytic in nature and tend to describe idealized
systems. Section C of Chapter III describes the basic flow model that is studied in
this thesis, and which is shown in Figure 6.
• Because of the complexity of the interaction between a four-indenture-level weapon
system and a three-echelon maintenance system, simulation of stochastic processes
is used as the primary modeling tool. Chapter IV contains an overview of available
simulation models, with emphasis on "TIGER", a FORTRAN-based program used
by the Naval Sea Systems Command in the U.S.Navy.
••
Due to the fact that there is no directly applicable simulation model for the given
problem, Chapter V shows the necessary' input modifications in the use of TIGER
to obtain useful results for the decisions to be made.
Chapter VI contains the results of the application of TIGER, and describes its
major shortcomings when used for the given problem. Basically it can offer only a
fixed number of input choices (due to the computer language used), restricting the
user to small weapon systems, and it does not enable the modeling of the back-flow
of repaired components of repaired systems to their respective stocks.
It appears that these problems could be overcome by using a modern, object-
oriented simulation language like MODSIM-II. Chapter VII describes how
MODSIM can be used for solving the given problem, and shows compiled code for
some of the objects in Appendix C. A full-scale-development of a simulation model
for the complex real two-system-interaction world is beyond the scope of this the-
sis.
This thesis ends with suggestions in Chapter VIII for the necessary future work to
be done on this topic, which might help both to increase the efficiency of the lo-
gistic part of the Weapon Acquisition Process and to improve the management of
the available financial resources within the defense budget of the Federal Republic
of Germanv.
II. THE MILITARY ENVIRONMENT OF THE UPCOMING DECISION
In this chapter the military environment of the decision model is defined by pre-
senting
• the modular structure of electronic equipment, applied in the weapons acquisition
process of the Federal Armed Forces Germany
• the general maintenance concept to provide support to these electronic systems in
the German Army[Ref. 2]
• the command structure of the German Army with combat, combat support, com-
munication and logistic forces.
A. MODULAR STRUCTURE OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
Electronic weapon systems in the notation of the German Armyi include weapon
systems with essential electronic components (e.g. battle tanks with an electronic
weapon guidance system, Artillery weapons controlled by a data link system), command-
and control systems, signal- and communication systems (e.g. AUTOVON (US) /
AUTOKO (GE)), reconnaissance systems (e.g. Artillery reconnaissance radar) and sig-
nal- and communication- intelligence systems. All these electronic weapon systems are
generally structured in 5 indenture levels2 as seen in Figure 1 on page 5:
1. The complete system itself- as an illustrative example we will look at a Battle Tank
assumed to be developed.
2. Subsystems or A-Units are functional units or self contained units within a weapon
system. In our example the (non-electronic) Gun. the (electronic) Weapon Guidance
Subsystem, the (electronic) Command- and Control Subsystem and the ("semi"-
electronic) Power Supply Subsystem are A-Units.
3. Assemblies or B-Units are integral parts of A-Units. Target Data Storage and Data
Display Terminal are B-Units of the Command- and Control Subsystem.
4. Subassemblies or C-Units and
5. Elements or D-Units are both the smallest replaceable components of a weapon
system. The "black box" Updated Target Data Memory is a C-Unit (subassembly)
that will not be repaired in the field, the Microchip A4512 is a D-Unit (element) that
can not be repaired at all.
1 This structure is slightly different from that used by the US Army in the Logistic Support
Analysis (LSA) procedures [Ref. 1, p.2-17].
2 The term indenture level is also used by the US Army to address the different levels of a
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Figure 1. Modular Structure of Electronic Equipment in the German Army
B. MAINTENANCE CONCEPT FOR ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
In general, the maintenance of any electronic weapon system is performed both by
military personnel for conventional technology (engine, steering system etc.) and by
military personnel for electronic technology. In this paper we concentrate only on the
maintenance concept for electronic equipment, shown in Table 1 on page 6 [Ref. 2].




Test Procedure Maintenance Procedure
System
User (Notation in the German Army: Maintenance Echelon 1)
Built-in-Test-Equipment (BITE)
Technical Manuals




by replacement of Line Replacea-
ble Units (LRU): B-Units; C-
Units and D-Units if appropriate
Organizational Maintenance (Maintenance Echelon 2)
B-Units
LRU-Test by Test, Measurement
and Diagnostic Equipment
(TMDE) / Technical Manuals
Off-System modular maintenance
of defective LRU by replacement
of C-Units and D-Units




Repair of C-Units by replacement
of D-Units
Depot Maintenance (Maintenance Echelon 4) or commercial mainte-
nance (Maintenance Echelon 4)
D-Units no test - no repair - recycle or discharge
C. MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE OF THE GERMAN ARMY
Germany is undergoing extensive political, economical and social changes since the
unification on October 3rd 1990. As a consequence, the military structure of the Federal
Armed Forces is subject to changes in the years ahead. The structure presented in the
next paragraphs is the general structure of the Army, which will persist whatever
changes and reductions might occur. Specific details and exact quantities are omitted
since they are irrelevant for the stated decision problem.
1. Combat, Combat Support and Communication Forces
The highest command level below the Federal Ministry of Defense, Headquarter
of the Army, at BONN is an Army Corps. The general command structure of an Army
Corps3 is shown in Figure 2 on page 7.
3 There are 3 Army Corps in the German Army
XXX
Combat Forces Combat Support and Communication Forces
Figure 2. Command Structure of a German Army Corps
While an electronic weapon system used in the Combat Forces is mostly de-
ployed in large numbers (e.g. there will be some thousand battle tanks with electronic
subsystems), the many different electronic weapon systems deployed in the combat
support and communication forces often consist of only a small number of units (e.g.
there will be only some 15 units of a communications- and signal-intelligence-system
within the entire Army).
2. Logistic Forces (Maintenance Component)
The structure of the maintenance component is presented completely, but the
supply component is shown only as far as it is under operational control of the mainte-
nance component.
a. Organizational Maintenance
Organizational Maintenance (Maintenance Echelon 2), both for conven-
tional materiel and for electronic materiel (EloMat), is provided by a Maintenance
Platoon for every Batallion, and by a Maintenance Group for every Company that is








X Tactical Sign forMaintenance facilities
Figure 3. Structure of the Organizational Maintenance
The quantity of the maintenance personnel is determined by the needed capacity, but
at least 1 soldier has to be available at each Batallion Company for each type of weapon
system. There is no supportive exchange of maintenance personnel between
Batallions Companies. The skill-level has "only" to be appropriate for localizing defec-
tive LRL'4 by using BITE or straightforward traditional techniques, and for replacing
them. Jobs requiring higher qualifications might be completed, if the personnel can per-
form them with the available tools and within the capacity limits of the uniu.
b. Intermediate Maintenance
The structure of the Maintenance Troops 5 (Maintenance Echelon 3) is
shown in Figure 4 on page 10.
Each Army Corps has 2 active Maintenance Batallions, servicing both the
conventional materiel and the electronic materiel (EloMat) of the Corps' Combat Sup-
port Forces and Communication Forces. Each Division has 1 Maintenance Batallion; 2
Companies service the conventional materiel of the Division's Combat Support Forces
and Communication Forces; 1 Company for electronic materiel services both the Divi-
sion's troops and the electronic materiel of the Brigades - though even' Brigade has its
own Maintenance Company, there is no service for electronic materiel on the Brigade's
command level.
The quantity of the maintenance personnel is determined by the needed ca-
pacity and the number of different fields of technology applied in the new system ("pure"
electronic, optronic, Laser, Radar etc.). Many jobs are performed by mobile mainte-
nance teams, and at least 2 soldiers have to be available at each Maintenance
Batallion Company (EloMat) for each type of supported electronic weapon system
and or each technology used. There is no supportive exchange of maintenance person-
nel between Corps and or Divisions. Though localization of defective C- and D-Units
for certain systems is performed by different personnel applying the complex Test,
Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE), the skill-level generally has to be
appropriate for localizing defective C- and D-Units using traditional techniques, and for
replacing these units. Again, jobs requiring higher qualifications might be completed, if
the personnel can perform them with the available tools and within the capacity limits
of the unit.
4 See pages xi and xii for a List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
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Figure 4. Structure of the Maintenance Troops
c. Depot Maintenance
Materiel with damages requiring work in Maintenance Echelon 4 leaves the
combat zone and is transported to central repair shops at Army Maintenance Installa-
tions, at depots or at commercial facilities.
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d. Interactions
While personnel of the Organizational Maintenance might perform jobs of
a higher Maintenance Echelon if capacity constraints, skill levels and available tools al-
low, maintenance teams of the Maintenance Troops can be ordered by their operational
command to work on surplus jobs on Maintenance Echelon 2, if this is the only way to
increase the availability of a certain electronic system at a certain military unit. How-
ever, this regulation will not be regarded in this model, because it should be constrained
to emergency situations.
e. Replacement Parts Supply and Storage
All considerations about replacement of LRU (B-Units/Assemblies) at
Maintenance Echelon 2 and C- (Subassemblies) and D-Units (Elements) at Maintenance
Echelon 3 are based on the immediate availability of replacement parts at these mainte-
nance facilities. Supply of these parts only on demand would take far too long to guar-
antee shortest possible times to repair.
To decrease the down time of a weapon system, each Maintenance Batallion
(intermediate maintenance level) has a Direct Exchange Stock (DES) for B-L'nits, and
if appropriate, also for selected C- and D-Units (see Table 1 on page 6). The military
user delivering a defective B-L'nit immediately receives, if available, an intact B-Unit in
exchange, while the defective B-L'nit will be added to the DES after repair. So the
downtime for a B-Unit (consequently the downtime of the failed system after being di-
agnosed and before actually being repaired) is reduced to the amount of transportation
time between military user and its assigned Maintenance Batallion. Of course, the
Maintenance Batallions also have a stock for the C- and D-Units needed for repair of
the defective B-Units.
Consequently, the model has to consider the necessary stock levels at the
facilities of Maintenance Echelon 2 and 3, but not further back in the line of supply
which will be assumed to have unlimited capacity.
D. CONSEQUENCES FOR THE UPCOMING DECISION
Resulting from the facts presented above, certain range limitations for the following
decision areas have to be observed:
1. Organizational Maintenance
Due to the concept of Organizational Maintenance, each Batallion/Company
supplied with a certain electronic weapon system has to be able to perform repair jobs
on its own equipment at Maintenance Echelon 2. So the decision to be made is not
11
about the fact of creating an installation at all, but "only" about the number of repair
personnel, which will be at least 1.
To keep the Organizational Maintenance as highly mobile as the weapon system
itself, a spare stock of A-Units generally will not be kept at the organizational level.
However, establishing such a (limited) spare stock might be one way to increase the
system availability, and can be one feature of the upcoming decision.
2. Intermediate Maintenance
Because some electronic weapon systems, especially those deployed in very small
numbers, are designed to avoid any work at Maintenance Echelon 3, the number of re-
pair personnel for a certain weapon system at Maintenance Echelon 3 might be 0. If
Maintenance Echelon 3 is appropriate, there are several choices for the location of
maintenance facilities. In Table 2 the possible mutual exclusive alternatives are shown.
In these cases stock levels for both the DES (Direct Exchange Stock) and the C- and
D-Units stock have to be determined.
Table 2. MAINTENANCE FACILITIES AT MAINTENANCE ECHELON 3
Command level of system
ployment




Brigade 1 per Division 12
Brigade + Division 1 per Division 12
Division 1 per Division 12
Division + Corps
1 per Corps 3
1 per Division and per Corps 15
Corps 1 per Corps 3
Brigade + Division + Corps
1 per Corps 3
1 per Division and per Corps 15
3. Depot Maintenance
The decision about the quantity of the maintenance personnel at the depot level
is not as important as at the organizational and intermediate level at this stage of the
decision problem. Therefore this problem will not be addressed, nor that of spare stock
levels at Depot Maintenance facilities which will be assumed to be infinite.
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III. THE THEORETICAL BASIS FOR THE UPCOMING DECISION
A. GENERAL APPROACHES FOR MAINTENANCE CONCEPTS
A survey of the articles published in the respective journals within the last years
shows numerous studies and papers about the modeling of optimal maintenance policies
for single- and multi-unit electronic and non-electronic systems; for example see [Ref.
3, 4, 5, 6 and 7]. An overview especially about models for multi-unit systems is given in
[Ref. 8].
These "... Multi-unit maintenance models are concerned with optimal maintenance
policies for a system consisting of several units of machines or many pieces of equip-
ment, which may or may not depend on each other ... The objective is to find optimal
repair rates (i.e., number of repairmen, number of repair facilities, etc.) ..."[Ref. 8].
Many of these models consider specialties needed in the defined military environ-
ment like
• more than one repair facility in the system
• failed equipment has to be sent to a certain repair facility
• multi-echelon maintenance structures.
So, the reader might ask, are we to invent the wheel again ? There are three main
reasons for a different approach to solve the given real-world problem.
1. Distributions for Failure and Repair Times
In many models mathematical procedures are simplified by assuming an expo-
nential distribution for both the times between failures and the repair times. Especially
regarding electronic components having a high reliability, this assumption may be un-
realistic for the times between failures. We will observe a high mean time between failure
(MTBF) with very few failure times being close to zero. Jardine and Buzacott [Ref. 6
,
p.286] even state that it is realistic to assume that there are no failures at all between the
start-up of the observed equipment (y = 0) and some time y > 0.
The assumption of exponential distribution may or may not be realistic for the
repair times. The exponential distribution for repair times says that the probability for
completion of a repair job in the next k units of time does not depend on how long the
repair job has been worked on already - not too realistic for some types of repair! There
will be a minimum time for each repair job (receiving the job, preparing the work place,
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performing test and measurement procedures, performing the genuine repair etc.).
Though there will be no values close to zero, we will observe a highly skewed distribution
with a lot of small TTR-values (caused by easy detectable mechanical or thermal dam-
ages followed by simple replacement of the damaged component) and, nevertheless, a
non-negligible number of observations with distinctive higher values (caused by short-
circuits etc.). Though some studies (e.g. see in [Ref. 8 ,p.5]) use general repair times, the
assumption of exponentially distributed TTR seems reasonable, when the nature of the
repair is random due to the random type of failure.
2. Optimality Criteria
Another great drawback is the use of all kinds of costs as optimality criteria to
achieve an optimized maintenance concept. This is legitimate and appropriate in all de-
scribed problems, especially in cases regarding not only costs for repair personnel and
repair facilities, but also costs for spare part inventories and costs in form of lost reven-
ues due to downtimes caused by failures. While lost revenue is irrelevant in the military
environment (though a lost battle has an enormous economic impact), most other types
of costs are not applicable in the described real-world situation, because they are neither
known nor can be acquired in this early stage of the acquisition process.
Other models additionally or exclusively use the availability of the system as a
decision criterion - for example see [Ref. 7, p. 551]. This approach is promising pertain-
ing to the given problem.
3. Available Information
Due to the fact that the future system is not defined exactly at this point of time,
we have to make a decision under extreme uncertainty . Because we do not have any test
results for single Subsystems, Assemblies or Subassemblies (with the exception of
standardized equipment), we have to create, in the most controlled way possible,
"probable probability distributions" for the times between failures for each proposed and
yet to be developed component of the planned System Breakdown Structure (SBS).
Based on this "solid ground", we have to come to a recommendation for the future
maintenance concept for this new electronic equipment.
Cho and Parlar [Ref. 8, p.3] realize that dilemma by stating "... Very few papers
have been written on the area of maintenance models with incomplete information ...".
The need for further research on this field within the military environment is emphasized
in a 1984 Notice of the Secretary of the Navy, D.E. Mann [Ref. 9, p.87]: "Although there
is considerable uncertainty early in the acquisition process, every effort must be made
to use the best available data and techniques in developing estimates."
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B. IDEALIZED APPROACH FOR GIVEN PROBLEM
1. Distributions for Time Between Failure
Regarding possible failure scenarios and evaluating the actual literature (e.g. see
[Ref. 6]), the Weibull and the Gamma distribution are the most appropriate to use for
time between failure.
The Weibull density function has the following form [Ref. 6, 10 and 11], also







and its cumulative distribution function has the form:
The Gamma density function has the following form [Ref. 13, p. 165, and 12]:
/g(0 = J r , : e fi ; 0<f<cx,,/?>0,a>0
fi T(a)
Its cumulative distribution function can not be obtained in closed form.
Using appropriate shape-parameters ("c" for the Weibull, "ft" for the Gamma)
and scale-parameters (a), both distributions are highly flexible to fit Exponential and
Normal distributions, and any other distribution being "humped in the middle". This
"flexibility" is shown in Figure 5 on page 16.
Jardine and Buzacott [Ref. 6] use the 3-parameter Weibull density function with
the third parameter "y", the location parameter. This is not appropriate in our situation.
Though the number of failures of one component occurring within a short time will be
very small, this possibility has to be regarded because there might be imperfect repairs.
Pertaining to this fact many studies assume that repaired components are as good as new
(e.g. in [Ref. 7]), which will not be realistic in a military environment - neither in war nor
in peacetime. Consequences of imperfect repair on system reliability are shown in [Ref.
14].
So the approach to the given real-world problem described here will use either
the 2-parameter Weibull or the Gamma distribution to model the time between failures
and the exponential distribution to model the repair times.
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DENSITY FUNCTIONS FOR FAILURES AND REPAIR








TBF - TIME BETWEEN FAILURE (HOURS)
400 BOO 1300
TV - TBIE BETWEEN FAILURE (HOURS)
Figure 5. The Flexibility of the Weibull and Gamma Density Functions
2. Links between Failure and Repair Times
Many authors assume exponentially distributed repair times, but most of them
also assume the same repair time distribution for all components which are subject to
failure. This is partially unrealistic for the described problem. There is not only a differ-
ence in repair times between changing a defective Subsystem in Organizational Mainte-
nance (which can be assumed to be relatively constant due to "design to quick
replacement"), and finding the defective Subassembly or Element within an Assembly
when repairing it in Intermediate Maintenance (which could be covered by assumption
of maintenance echelon specific repair times - a concept used by Madu in [Ref. 3, p. 959
- 960]), but there are also decisive differences in repair times between different technol-
ogies at Intermediate Maintenance. Each specified component "X" of the future system
will be characterized by 3 parameters:
1. cx
-value for the "probable" distribution for times between failures for component
"X" (in case of the Gamma distribution the fix-value)
2. otjr-value for the "probable" distribution for times between failures for component
"X"
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3. MTTRX , the "probable" technology dependent MTTR for component "X"
Pertaining to this necessary approach no literature at all was to be found.
3. Source of Information
With the future system just being defined in terms of a SBS (system breakdown
structure), there are no data available for the necessary values of
cx or fix , a.x and MTTRX . Jardine [Ref. 6, p. 288] mentions three basic approaches to es-
timate these data. While the third approach - models based on physical, chemical or
other mechanisms of failure - is not appropriate due to the uncertainty of the engineering
design at the relevant point in time, a combination of the other two approaches seems
applicable:
1. Analysis of empirical data on a similar design
2. Prediction of system reliability from component reliability
With each single repair job done at Maintenance Echelon 2, 3 or 4 within the
German Army, a lot of data are gathered offering information about the proceeding of
the job over time. Active maintenance times (AMT = TTR = ART (Active Repair
Time)) and the MTTR can be obtained directly. Administrative delay times (ADT),
caused by maintenance system inherent procedures and geographical distances, and lo-
gistic delay times (LDT), caused by ordering and waiting for spare parts not in stock at
the maintenance facility can be estimated. Throughout the lifetime of each single weapon
system, data are gathered about down times from which the times between failures
(TBF) can be obtained. From these known TBF data the appropriate a, fi and c-values
can be obtained by using GRAFSTAT [Ref. 12, "FITTING PROBABILITY
DISTRIBUTIONS"].
Though we do not know the exact characteristics of the components of the fu-
ture weapon system, we can assume that these values are not too different for compo-
nents with similar functional characteristics (e.g. antennas, terminal keyboards, displays,
RADAR-emitters, military computers etc.) and within the same level of technology,
which have already provided plenty of realistic data from the actual use in the real
(peacetime) world. Definite sources of trouble will be a differentiation of similar com-
ponents originating from different contractors, the evaluation of offered "next technol-
ogy7 generation" components and the adaptation of the data to a wartime scenario
(further research has to be done on these features).
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If a totally new functional configuration will be introduced, the subcomponents
still will offer a chance to find appropriate values, from which the reliability for the next
higher SBS-level can be computed.
4. Optimality Criterion
As pointed out in 1 1 1.A. 2., system availability is one meaningful optimality cri-
terion for evaluating future maintenance performance problems. This availability defi-
nitely depends upon the reliability of the system, but can be increased decisively by an
appropriate maintenance system. Before proceeding further, we need to recall the defi-
nitions and characteristics of reliability and availability.
• Reliability
The probability that a weapon system will perform its intended function for a
specified period of time under stated conditions [Ref.6, p.285, 15, p.32, and 16, p. 20].
The reliability function R(t) is well defmed as
r
f[t)dt
where J[t) is the probability density function of the time between failures. Therefore the
reliability function RJ^t) for the general form of the Weibull distribution has the form
(c> 0, a > 0):
R(t) =
5
Although there is no closed form for the reliability function for the Gamma distribution,
we could use the incomplete Poisson Sum for integer values of a to compute R(t).
The reliability values obtained by this approach depend on 2 features:
• the distribution of the times between failures, which is independent from the applied
maintenance concept
• the length of the specified period of time, which can be "varied to achieve any reli-
ability value desired" (R -> for t -> oo, R -> 1 for ; -» 0)
Due to the independence from the maintenance concept, and due to possible
bias by "conveniently" choosing the length of the time period, reliability is not suitable
as an optimality criterion in the given problem.
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• Availability
The probability that a weapon system is in the operable state at any point of time
when used under stated conditions[Ref. 15
,
p. 29 and 17, p. 19].
A generally used computational formulation of availability is the operational
availability being defined [Ref. 17] as
, MTBM
° MTBM+MDT
where MTBM is the Mean Time Between Maintenance and MDT is the Mean Down
Time. MDT itself is the sum of MAMT (Mean Active Maintenance Time), LDT (Lo-
gistics Delay Time) and ADT (Administrative Delay Time). Considering a long period
of time this approach offers an average availability, which strongly depends - via MDT
- on the applied system specific maintenance concept. However, MDT itself can not be
handled as an average value, because this approach would not take into account worst
case scenarios, where many components might fail within a short period of time, im-
posing decisively more workload onto the maintenance system in some periods of time
than under the mean value approach.
This average availability is the appropriate optimality criterion for the given
problem. Note that there is a decisive difference between the availability (combat readiness)
of a military unit, and the availability of a single unit of a weapon system within this mili-
tary unit. Only the latter will be covered here.
C. THE STOCHASTIC MODEL OF THE MAINTENANCE SYSTEM
The system specific maintenance system, determined by the number of deployed
systems and introduced in I.B.,C. and D., can be described as a stochastic network,
shown in Figure 6 on page 20 (See in comparison also [Ref. 18, p. 18]).
1. Fixed Parameters
Its characterizing fixed parameters are defined in Table 3 on page 21. All given times
are in hours, based on a (peacetime) average of 7 hours of use per day, 5 days of use per
week and 48 of these weeks per year. E.g., ADT3 = 35 means a delay of 35 hours of
simulation time, which is about a week in peacetime, but 1 day and 1 1 hours in a war-
time situation with a time of use of 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and 52 weeks a year.
So these times are realistic for all possible scenarios.
2. Decision Orientated Variable Parameters






































































Figure 6. Stochastic Model of the Maintenance System
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Table 3. FIXED PARAMETERS OF THE MAINTENANCE SYSTEM










Total number of systems deployed
s Number of systems deployed in one unit
V*
Number of units per Division supplied with the sys-
tem
Dc
Number of Divisions per Corps supplied with the
system
Uc
Number of units under direct operational command
of a Corps supplied with the system
MARTA 2
Mean Active Repair Time for an A-Unit by replace-
ment of a B-Unit (see III.B.2.) or by performance o[
simple repair without replacement
MARTB 2- 14
Active Repair Time for a B-Unit by replacement of
C- and D-Units (error location and actual replace-
ment) is dependent on the used technology
LDTtnch 1
Number of delay hours caused by logistic delay per
repair job in all Maintenance Echelons if required
spare part is in stock at maintenance facility
LDTDES 10
Number of delay hours caused by logistic delay per
repair job in Maintenance Echelon 2 if required As-
sembly has to be obtained from DES at Intermediate
Maintenance
LDT^ LS ' supply 35
Number of delay hours caused by logistic delay per
repair job in Maintenance Echelon 3 if required spare
part is not in stock, but available in the military sup-
ply line
ADT2 2
Number of hours caused by administrative delay per
repair job in Maintenance Echelon 2
ADT, 35
Number of hours caused by administrative delay per
repair job in Maintenance Echelon 3 (including trans-
port times)
a decision has to be made. Realistic values will be chosen as initial input data6, and will
have to be readjusted for each new run of the simulation.
6 What is realistic is determined by already known budgetary' constraints, general personnel
policies etc., and depends strongly upon the knowledge of an user experienced in his functional
specialty.
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Table 4. VARIABLE PARAMETERS OF THE MAINTENANCE SYSTEM
Parameter Description
R2 Number of repair personnel at Maintenance Echelon 2
P2stock (name)
Number of spare parts of component "name" in stock at Mainte-
nance Echelon 2
Rid Number of repair personnel at Maintenance Echelon 3 (Division)
PiDsuek {mmt) Number of spare parts of component "name" in stock at Mainte-
nance Echelon 3 (Division)
R-ic Number of repair personnel at Maintenance Echelon 3 (Corps)
P2CsrocA (name)
Number of spare parts of component "name" in stock at Mainte-
nance Echelon 3 (Corps)
3. Additional Variable Parameters
Some military performance requirements for a new system can be looked upon
as variable parameters. If the required availability can not be achieved within the real-
istic range of the decision variables, reruns of the simulation with relaxed requirements
can offer more insight into the problem. In Table 5 on page 22 the most important pa-
rameter of this kind is shown.
An example for this feature is any electronic device backed up by a mechanical
device, where the electronic device may have DTmiX = 14, whereas for example commu-
nication devices will generally have DTmix = .
Table 5. VARIABLE REQUIREMENT PARAMETERS




Maximum allowable downtime for component "X"
which will not decrease the operational capability of
the system, and therefore will not count as a failure
D. REALIZATION OF THE IDEALIZED APPROACH
The applicability of the available closed form tools for the modeling and evaluating
of the behavior of the complex modular structure of a new and mostly unknown elec-
tronic weapon system within the given three-echelon maintenance system of the German
Armv is limited in three wavs:
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1. It is a nightmare to apply the closed form tools for calculating the desired results
under the assumption of Weibull- or Gamma-distributed Times Between Failures
2. Applying exponential failure rates will make the closed form calculations much
easier, but too many assumptions have to be made, unreasonably simplifying the
real world environment
3. Though a closed form calculation could be done by a computer program, this
program will not be flexible enough for applications with different configurations.
The only way to proceed is the application of an open form method, the simulation
of the complex real world situation. In simulating this situation it is generally assumed
that
• A system is down when one component fails, and is up again when this component
is replaced
• No aging takes places during downtimes
• For each repaired component a new time to next failure starts.
Using simulation we have to decide on the length of the time period simulated. This
time period will be split up in
1. the phase used for determination of the reliability of the system (though we will not
use it as a decision criterion)
2. a second phase up to the end of the time period, which is determined by war ana-
lysts to reflect a realistic war scenario (to obtain numerical values for spare part
s;ocks at Organizational and Intermediate Maintenance facilities)
3. a third phase up to the end of simulation time, which has to be determined yet (to
cover long-run aspects)
For illustration purposes we will introduce a Sample System in the next chapter (see
Figure 8 on page 34). From the (fictitious) current ADM (Acquisition Decision Mem-
orandum) for this Sample System we learn that the required time period for reliability-
considerations (the average system availability required is 90 %) is set to 175 hours, i.e.
5 weeks of peacetime or 1 week of wartime. So the length of the first time phase will be
175 hours.
Though the future NATO wartime scenario is about to be redefined after the end
of the cold war, the "historical" value of 30 days of wartime is applied. So the end of the
second time phase will be at 720 hours, resulting in a phase duration of 720-175= 545
hours.
Special considerations are necessary to determine the appropriate total simulation
time. Due to the fact that many components have a MTBF that is decisively greater than
720 hours, many of these components will not fail within the first two simulation time
23
phases, and might create the impression that they are not necessarily to be kept in stock.
Another drawback is the fact that the Mean Time To First Failure (MTTFF) is always
greater than the Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF), which causes the average avail-
ability and the expected MTBF to be computed with higher values than using a longer
time period. To give each Subassembly and each Element the "chance to fail" within the
simulation horizon, the total simulation time period should be chosen at a value some
10 times as large as the largest MTBF-value of any Subassembly or Element. With this
method the computed availability of the system also asymptotically approaches the
steady state value, because the initial MTTFF is dominated by an increasing number of
MTBF-values used.
Consequently the time horizon for our Sample System will be 15230 hours (MTBF
of Subassembly A02A = 1523 hours), divided in a first phase of 175 hours (to obtain a
reliability value), a second phase of 545 hours (to obtain the necessary spare part stocks
for a war scenario of 30 days), and a third phase with the remaining 14510 hours (to
achieve the availability and the MTBF-value of the system in the long run).
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IV. DEVELOPED AND APPLICABLE MULTI-ECHELON MODELS
A. EVALUATION OF EXISTING MULTI-ECHELON MODELS
Research among existing multi-echelon simulation models used by all branches of
the U.S. Armed Forces showed that these programs are mainly aimed at the solution of
the following problems [Ref. 19]:
• Tie budget dollars to readiness. This approach can not help in our case, because
costs are unknown at the respective point of time in the acquisition process.
• Determine the inventor} levels required at each echelon of supply given a readiness
objective. This aspect comes closer to the problem to be solved, but it is based upon
a given number of repair personnel. While this feature can help in the second part
of the problem, it does not solve the essential problem of determining the number
of repair personnel at each maintenance echelon.
• Predict readiness given the inventory level at each echelon of supply. Also this feature
can not help in our case, because its basis are the numbers we need from the sim-
ulation.
Generally it is to be stated that all models concentrate on the supply side of the
multi-echelon idea. As stated for the given problem in Il.C.2.e., necessary stock levels
r.re only considered as far as these stocks are located at the respective maintenance fa-
cilities. The three-echelon maintenance system represented by our stochastic model (see
Figure 6 on page 20) is a closed environment, where the only link to the "outside world"
is the replacement parts stock for D-Units at Depot Maintenance.
One way to proceed is the development of a new program that simulates the be-
havior of a weapon system with four indenture levels within the military environment
of a closed three echelon maintenance system. But this task is far beyond the scope of
a master's thesis. Another way to approach the problem is the application of one of
these existing simulation programs under flexible use of the offered features close to the
problem. One simulation program that is both applicable under this approach and
available for use by a foreign student at the Naval Postgraduate School is the "TIGER
Reliability Computer Program", developed and distributed for Government use by the
NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND, Washington D.C. [Ref. 20].
B. THE SIMULATION PROGRAM "TIGER"
TIGER is designed to calculate the mission performance parameters of ship system
reliability and availability, and concentrates on the efficient supply with spares within
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the Naval Supply System under consideration of available repair shop capacities and
failure characteristics of the used equipment. It is in use in the US Army and US Air
Force, too, and can be applied stepwise to obtain all the data which are needed to solve
the given decision problem.
For use in this thesis, the program is first introduced with the problem relevant input
and output options. Later the necessary sequence of steps in applying "TIGER" is de-
veloped using a sample system.
1. General Overview
The general objective of "TIGER" is the prediction of RAM (Reliability,
Availability, Maintainability) performance of a general system, defined by data about
the components within its indenture levels. "TIGER" is an event driven stochastic sim-
ulator [Ref. 20, p. 2-5], and generates internally the following component events:
1. Failure of a component
2. Arrival of a spare part for a waiting component
3. Release of shop capacity for a waiting component
4. Repair of a component
The special features necessary to solve the given problem are listed below [Ref. 20, p.2-7
- 2-9], including first remarks about their sometimes limited applicability for the given
problem.
• Gamma distribution for failures and delays, and exponential distribution for repair
times; however, only integer /?-values from 1 to 9 are possible (where /? = 9 comes
closest to a Normal distribution)
• Limited shop capacities; these shop capacities are the central decision parameters;
however, the only shops considered are one "General Shop" and up to 20 specialty
shops
• Allowable downtime; because not all components ofa weapon system are essential
for the mission performance, the failure of certain components can be tolerated for
some time without being counted as system failure
• Group rules; using string rules all grouped components are turned off while the
group is down due to failure of a specified control component 7, while standby rules
take care of redundancies
• Logistic models; offering both spares inventory policy and unlimited spares
7 In order to avoid excessive simulation run times the application of this rule is only appro-
\1TRF
pnate, if < 50 (Ref. 20, p. 5-2]
J VI J J
^-specified control component
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2. The Input Formats
The input formats are described in [Ref. 20, section 3]. To get an idea about the
input structure, the relevant input formats needed to start a "TIGER" simulation are
described below (the numbers indicate the respective TIGER input format):
1. Distinctive name of simulation (for later identification)
2. Number of Monte Carlo simulations; optional individual integer random seed
3. Time horizon of simulation; phase definitions for successive simulations under
changing conditions and/or changing configurations (up to 6 phases in one simu-
lation run)
4. - blank -
5. Selection of printout option
6. - blank -
7. Multiplier for all MTBF-values to model special conditions; multiplier for all
MTTR-values to model special conditions; capacity of general shop; capacity of
special repair shops
8. Component identification: user defined type number (between 1 and 200) and name
for easier identification of maximal 200 different component types; MTBF; MTTR
or indicator for not repairable item; LDTsupp/y ; LDTst0Ck ; probability that a repair re-
quires a part at all (complementary probability that a failure can be fixed by simple
methods); Gamma shape parameter for delay times; Gamma shape parameter for
failures
9. - blank -
10. - blank -
11. - blank -
12. enumeration of all components used in the System (up to 500 components of the
above defined 200 different types); a system in the way "TIGER" is used here can
be a single unit of the Weapon System with components being Subsystems, or can
be a military command level with components being military units using Sun, t units
of the Weapon System
13. - blank
-
14. Indicator for unlimited spares or general number of spares (same number for each
type of spare)
15. Individual number of spares per component (overrides format 14)
16. System definition (system in a general sense, not as an indenture level of an elec-
tronic system; from now on referenced as "TIGER system definition"); in contrary
to the known or estimated components which are defined with type numbers 1 to
500 in format 8, in this and the two following formats the unknown System, the
Subsystems and the Assemblies are defined with type numbers 501 to 1000.
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17. Subsystem definition (components building up System defined in format 16; from
now on referenced as "TIGER subsystem definition); allowable downtimes for
these "TIGER subsystems"
18. Group definition (components building up the "TIGER system" and the "TIGER
subsystems" defined in format 16 and 17, which are controlled by standby- and
string rules (see I V.B.I)
19. Standbv- and string rules
20. - blank -
21. - blank -
3. The Output Formats
"TIGER" offers a variety of output options. The output formats are listed and
described below as far as they are relevant for the given problem:
1. Phase Figure of Merit Final Report [Ref. 20, p. 10-7] for the entire system
a. Mean for reliability at the end of each time phase
b. Mean for availability at the end of each time phase
2. Final Figure of Merit Summary [Ref. 20, p. 10-7] for the entire system
a. Mean and variance for reliability at the end of the simulation time
b. Mean and variance for availability at the end of the simulation time
c. Mean and variance of the MTBF at the end of the simulation time
d. Estimate of the long-term value of the availability
e. Estimate of the long-term value of the MTBF
3. Subsystems Figures of Merit [Ref. 20, p. 10-7] for each subsystem
• Average Availability at the end of each time phase
4. Component Performance Statistics [Ref. 20, p. 10-12]
• Summary of spares used at the end of the simulation time
5. Critical Component List [Ref. 20, p. 10-12].
• Contribution of each component type to the unavailability of the entire system
and each subsvstem
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V. THE DECISION MODEL
A. DECISION VARIABLES
As already discussed in III.C.2 and shown in Table 4 on page 22, the following de-
cision variables have to be handled:
1. R2f the number of repair personnel at Maintenance Echelon 2 (Organizational
Maintenance)
2. P2st0Ck(B-Lmt), the number of spare B-L'nits in stock at Maintenance Echelon 2
3. RiD , the number of repair personnel at Maintenance Echelon 3 (Intermediate
Maintenance) at Division level
4- PiDsroJB-,C- or D-Unit), the number of spare B-, C- and D-L'nits in stock at
Maintenance Echelon 3 at Division level
5. #3C , the number of repair personnel at Maintenance Echelon 3 (Intermediate
Maintenance) at Corps level
6- PiCs:?c>(B-,C- or D-Lnit), the number of spare B-, C- and D-L'nits in stock at
Maintenance Echelon 3 at Corps level
However, the way to obtain RiD and R2Dslcck is the same as obtaining RiC and R iC!locl,
• they differ only in the number of weapon systems to be supported by one Maintenance
Batallion. So in the further approach, which will develop the actual utilization of avail-
able tools, we will cover only R2 , R i} P2slock ( B-L'nits) and Pist0Ck(B-. C- and D-L'nits).
B. INFLUENCE DIAGRAM
Due to the fact that there is no directly applicable simulation model for the given
maintenance environment, we have to decide about the necessary steps in using the
available programs. To gain insight into the decision problem structure, we develop an
Influence Diagram , shown in Figure 7 on page 30.
1. Given Data
The only given data at the beginning of the decision process are
• The (rough) structure of the new Weapon System with
definition of functional units
level of used technology
redundancy concept







































• • • •
• . • •
random variables
assumptions to be made during use of decision aid
results
result to be achieved
Figure 7. Influence Diagram for the Upcoming Decision
30
2. Available Data
For many already deployed systems the TBF- and TTR-values for Subsystems,
Assemblies, Subassemblies and Elements are recorded and available. The functional
characteristics of these evaluated components are known, also their technology level.
Based on the given System Structure we can exploit similarities between components of
the future system and known components. However, this link is not straightforward, and
has the character of an assumption.
3. Direct Conclusions
Based on the used TTR- and TBF-values for the Subassemblies and Elements
of the new system, and assuming unlimited personnel and materiel resources at Organ-
izational Maintenance, we can obtain an Upper Availability Limit for one unit of the
new system. This is a technology determined upper value, which can not be increased
by any organizational decision or any other means.
4. Decision Variables
a. Personnel in Organizational Maintenance
Based on the System Structure, the required Average System Availability,
the estimated TBF-values and the Upper Availability Limit, and under assumption of
unlimited supply of B-Units at Organizational Maintenance, the consequences of certain
numbers of repair personnel at Organizational Maintenance can be modeled and a de-
cision based on an analysis can be made.
b. Materiel in Organizational Maintenance
Based on the available personnel at Organizational Maintenance (= the
number decided upon), the estimated TBF-values and the underlying war scenario, the
consequences of certain stock levels of B-Units at Organizational Maintenance can be
modeled and a decision based on analysis can be made.
c. Personnel in Intermediate Maintenance
Based on the System Structure, the estimated TBF-values and the Upper
Availability Limit, and under assumption of unlimited supply of C- and D-Units at
Intermediate Maintenance, the consequences of certain numbers of repair personnel at
Intermediate Maintenance can be modeled and a decision based on an analysis can be
made.
d. Materiel in Intermediate Maintenance
Based on the available personnel at Intermediate Maintenance (= the
number decided upon), the estimated TBF-values and the underlying war scenario, the
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consequences of certain stock levels of B-, C- and D-L'nits at Intermediate Maintenance
can be modeled and a decision based on analysis can be made.
5. Final Conclusion
Based on the personnel and materiel quantities at Organizational Maintenance,
and under assumption of sufficient personnel and materiel quantities at Intermediate
Maintenance (= the numbers decided upon), the Maximum Achievable Average System
Availability under the quantified Maintenance System can be checked versus the Upper
Availability Limit.
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VI. SIMULATION WITH THE TIGER PROGRAM
At first the preparative structuring of the new Weapon System for the input process
is described, followed by the essential input steps for each successive simulation run. The
applicability of the respective results for our decision problem is shown, and the rea-
soning for the next input step is derived.
A. PREPARATIVE STRUCTURING OF THE WEAPON SYSTEM
To simplify the illustration of the use of "TIGER" in solving the given problem, and
to show the emerging results and their consequences, the program is applied to the
simple yet complete Sample System configuration shown in Figure 8 on page 34.
In contrast to the "TIGER" concept only very few components (if any at all) shown
in our Sample System configuration have known TBF and TTR. Proceeding down from
the System level, and skipping the Subsystem level, all Assemblies are checked for avail-
able MTBF-data, /?-values for the distribution of the TBF and MTTR-data:
1. If there are no real data available for an Assembly, we proceed further down and
check the Subassemblies and those Elements which are not a direct part of a Sub-
assembly. Elements within a Subassembly are only handled by depot level mainte-
nance, which is not covered here (see I.D.3)
a. If we have real data for a Subassembly or an Element, which might be in use in
an already deployed weapon system, these data are applied
b. If there are no real data available, data from a component with similar functional
characteristics and a comparable level of technology are applied
c. In case of several similar components with different parameters or in case of
components with a totally new conceptual design, the best possible estimates 8
have to be applied
2. If we have real data from an Assembly, which is in use in an already deployed
weapon system, the Assembly itself is treated as an unknown, but with exactly one
known Subassembly
3. As a further preparation for the input the known or estimated Subassemblies and
Elements are assigned a type number between 1 and 500, all unknown Subsystems
and Assemblies a number between 501 and 1000. One possible choice for assigning
these numbers is shown in Figure 8 on page 34.
At the end of this process each branch of the configuration tree ends with a com-
ponent for which the MTBF, /? and MTTR data are fixed. Because we do not have any




































MTBF = 1327, (3 = 3
A01A MTTR = 4.1
MTBF = 644 / 8 = 9






A02A MTTR = 3.6
MTBF = 1523,6 = 9
A0201 no repair
15 MTBF = 344, 6 = 9
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B0101 no repair




MTBF = 866, 6 = 7
B0201 no repair
MTBF= 1167, 6 = 5
B02A MTTR = 13 8
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MTBF = 544, 6 = 9
C0101 no repair





C02A MTTR = 3 8
MTBF=1003,6 = 4




MTBF = 210, 6 = 9






MTBF = 375, 6 = 5
D01A MTTR = 1.5
MTBF = 445, 6 = 9
D01B MTTR = 41
MTBF = 1127,6 = 8
D01C MTTR = 22 6
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MTBF = 554, 6 = 5
D02A MTTR = 7.2
MTBF = 1303, 6 = 3
D0201 no repair
46 MTBF = 628, 6 = 2
D03 MTTR = 2.3
known assembly
Figure 8. Sample System Configuration (Prepared for Input)
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information about interdependencies between components at this stage of the develop-
ment process, we assume that there are none at the moment. Components with stand-by
redundancies (groups of components, where in case of failure of the active component
another component starts operating) are grouped using the TIGER stand-by rule; gen-
erally string rules will not be applied, because for electronic equipment with high reli-
abilities and short repair times the MTBF/MTTR-quotient (see footnote 7 on page 26)
will mostly be considerably higher than 50.
B. MAXIMUM AVERAGE WEAPON SYSTEM AVAILABILITY
The input file for the first simulation step lists all Subassemblies and Elements with
their (known or estimated) individual MTBF- and jS-values to determine the failure
characteristics of the entire (unknown) system. Each failure of any component initializes
the repair of the failed A-L'nit (Subsystem) by replacing the failed B-Unit (Assembly
within the failed A-Unit). This repair time can be assumed to be relatively constant due
to the technology used (BITE etc., see Table 1 and Table 3, MARTA ). Starting with the
general maintenance system, i.e. without applying any exceptional regulations, we will
obtain the maximum achievable availability under ideal conditions by assuming both
unlimited shop capacity and unlimited supply of spare B-Units at Organizational Main-
tenance. Because, at this point of time, we do not need any information about spare
parts used, we do not need to record the results of the second time phase (see III.D.).
To gain more insight into the Maintenance of the new Weapon System, we addi-
tionally consider 2 methods for increasing the numerical value of the maximum possible
average system availability:
• Relaxed Tactical Requirements. The Mission Need Statements (MNS), which ini-
tialize the acquisition process for a new weapon system, tend to require an avail-
ability of a weapon system close to 100% with no allowable downtimes for any
Subsystem. In many projects this goal can not be achieved even under the ideal
approach described above. Therefore allowable downtimes for selected Subsystems
are additionally entered. It is essential to point out, that the quality of the weapon
system is not improved at all by this means - it is just a statistical improvement aimed
at the purpose of the decision aid !
• Exceptional Spare Stock of A-Units (Subsystems) at location of Organizational
Maintenance. Now an unlimited spare stock of A-Units at the organizational level
is allowed, actually reducing the mean delay time until resuming operation.
1. Step 1, Run 1 - System in the General Maintenance System
For the fust step one unit of the Weapon System is defmed in a format 16
statement ("TIGER system definition"), and all Assemblies, Subassemblies and Elements
are assigned to their respective Subsystem under format 17 ("TIGER subsystem defi-
35
nition"). Strictly following the rules (see II.D.l. - no spare stock of A-Units at the or-
ganizational level), the resulting mean delay time until resuming operation is
MARTA + LDTSrock + ADT2 = 5, given the required B-Unit is available at the re-
placement parts stock of the Organizational Maintenance. Due to the "fixed" repair time
of 5 hours this value is entered as "real organizational delay", while the MTTR-values
for all Subassemblies and Elements are set to 0.001 (Tiger default value). This method
is necessary to neglect any repair times for these components, which are irrelevant in this
first step. Without regarding any eventually allowable downtimes, the results of the first
simulation run offer a set of data based on the technology used and on the unmodified
general maintenance system. Any possible real-world logistic delays could not happen
due to assumption.
The following results are determined from the first run:
• Upper limit for Average System Availability under consideration of technology and
general maintenance system. Without any exceptional regulations within the general
maintenance system no higher value for the average availability can be achieved.
• MTBF for one unit of the System under the conditions stated above
• As additional information we obtain the Reliability for the time period entered as
first phase duration. But as pointed out above (see 1 1 1.B.4.), reliability can not be
used as a criterion for the upcoming decision, and therefore will be tracked only
occasionally.
The relevant results for our Sample System (for this and the next three runs) are
listed in Table 6 on page 38.
2. Step 1, Run 2 - System under Relaxed Tactical Requirements
In many projects the desired availability can not be achieved even under the
ideal approach modeled in Run 1. Therefore the second run additionally regards allow-
able downtimes for selected Subsystems under tactical considerations.
The results of the second run offer:
• Tactically Increased Upper Limit for Average System Availability . By allowing
downtimes for not-operationally-essential Subsystems, the technology determined
upper limit for the average availability of each unit of the Weapon System will be
increased once more, offering insight into the consequences of tight requirements.
• MTBFfor one unit of the System under the conditions stated above
The MTBF-value should be decisively higher than that in Run 1 (less failures
counted for calculation of down time).
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3. Step 1, Run 3 - System in Modified Maintenance System
For the third run one unit of the Weapon System is defined in the same way as
in Step 1. But now an unlimited spare stock of A-Units at the organizational level is al-
lowed, reducing the mean delay time until resuming operation to
LDTU0Ck + ADT2 = 3. This value is now entered as "real organizational delay", while
the MTTR-values are kept at 0.001. Assuming unlimited shop capacity and no allowable
downtimes again, an ideal (modified) logistic environment is modeled - the results of the
third run offer a set of data based on the technology used and represent the maximum
achievable average availability of the planned Weapon System in the three echelon
maintenance system under exceptional regulations.
The following results are offered from the third run:
• Technology determined absolute upper limit for A verage System A variability. With
no organizational or any other means can any higher value for the average avail-
ability be achieved within the given maintenance system.
• MTBFfor one unit of the System under the conditions stated above (should be close
to the MTBF-value obtained from Step 1, Run 1 - differences due to simulation)
4. Step 1, Run 4 - System Behavior under Both Methods
As described for Step 1, Run 2, additionally allowable downtimes for selected
Subsystems under tactical considerations are entered. The results of the fourth run offer:
• Tactically increased absolute upper limit for Average System Availability
• MTBFfor one unit of the System under the conditions stated above (should be close
to the MTBF-value obtained from Step 1, Run 2 - differences due to simulation)
5. Evaluation of Step 1
The requirements and the relevant results from Step 1 for the given Sample
System are summarized in Table 6 on page 38.
The standard deviation for all A -values obtained by simulation is 0.000, point-
ing out that at t= 15230 we obviously have reached a steady state. Dependent on the
required availability and the results, some options for the further approach might no
longer be reasonable. In our example, no stock of A-Units at the location of the Or-
ganizational Maintenance has to be considered, because the required availability of 90
% can be achieved under the allowable-downtime approach^.
9 These results also offer insight into the consequences of too tight tactical requirements, which
might drive up costs if accepted without analysis
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Table 6. MAXIMUM ACHIEVABLE SYSTEM AVAILABILITY
Average
Availability MTBF R MTTFF
Requirement A = 0.900
No stock of A-Units, no allowable
downtimes A = 0.892 43.6 0.696 227.2
No stock of A-Units, relaxed require-
ments A = 0.934 72.3 0.924 299.2
Unlimited stock, no allowable down-
times A = 0.934 43.8 0.700 214.0
Unlimited stock, relaxed requirements A = 0.960 72.6 0.928 292.3
So the further approach uses the environment modeled in Run 2. The input file
for Run 2 is shown completely in Appendix A, and the resulting output for Step 1, Run
2 is shown partially (without computer system messages, input echo and an error mes-
sage^) in Appendix B.
C. PERSONNEL QUANTITIES AT ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE
Still under the assumption of an unlimited stock of B-Units, the unlimited repair
capacity at Organizational Maintenance will be reduced now to realistic values. To
model this situation, a new approach is needed, using MTBF-values of all Subsystems,
and regarding the entire military user unit. We do not need information about spare
parts used nor about the reliability of the subsystems. Therefore we do not record the
results of the first two time phases.
1. Step 2, Run 1 - MTBF-Values for Subsystems
To obtain these MTBF-values, each Subsystem is defined in a format 16 state-
ment ("TIGER system definition") and as only Subsystem under format 17 ("TIGER
subsystem definition"), while all its Subassemblies and Elements are assigned to this one
Subsystem. The environment for these simulation steps assumes no stock of A-Units at
Organizational Maintenance, and no allowable downtimes are entered to obtain the
technology determined MTBF. The repair shop capacity is without influence on the re-
10 TIGER calculates the reliability for t= 15230 as R< 16-65 and causes a "Floating Point
Underflow Exception"; using "Standard Corrective Action", the value of R is set to 0.000, and the
program completes correctly
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suit of Run 1, and is kept unlimited. One run for each Subsystem has to be performed.
The following result is offered from the first run:
• Technology determined MTBF-J'alues of all Subsystems
Due to the characteristics of the TIGER simulation these values are offered
without any distribution parameters. In order to avoid unrealistic simplification by using
the mean values only, the generally accepted assumption of exponential distribution for
time between failure (see 1 1 I.A.I) will be used for further computations.
For our Sample System the following results are obtained:
Table 7. MTBF-VALUES FOR SUBSYSTEMS
Subsystem MTBF
^simulation A
A 145.7 6.513 0.966
B 471.3 6.470 0.990
C 206.0 7.035 0.976
D 110.3 6.073 0.956
Entire System 72.30 6.150 0.934
2. Step 2, Run 2 - Minimum Personnel Quantity, Unlimited Stock
Starting with personnel quantity of 1 (the minimum value - see I I.D.I), we de-
fine the military unit in format 16 ("TIGER system definition"), consisting of Sun„ sets
of all Subsystems. For our Sample System we learn from the (assumed) ADM that each
military unit has Sunil = 17 units of the Weapon System. The MTTR is 2 hours (see
Table 3); the stock of B-Units is unlimited; the delay time is LDTsl0Ck + ADT2 = 3
hours. Due to the characteristics of TIGER the "allowable downtime" approach is not
applicable in this data input configuration - allowable downtimes can be entered only for
"TIGER subsystems" (here the 17 weapon systems). That means for our Sample System
that the maximum achievable Average System Availability will be 0.892 (subject to de-
viations due to simulation) instead of 0.934, which has to be considered in evaluating the
output and deciding upon the personnel quantity.
Because we are primarily not interested in the "TIGER system" availability (the
"availability" of one military unit), but in the availability of each unit of the Weapon
System (the "TIGER subsystem" availability), the output option for subsystems has to
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be chosen. Nevertheless, defining the military unit as available (combat ready) if 15 out
of 17 weapon systems are up, we will have a glance at this value.
The following result is offered from the second Run:
• Upper limit for Average System Availability at minimum personnel quantity at Or-
ganizational Maintenance
3. Step 2, Run 3 - Increased Personnel Quantity, Unlimited Stock
If the resulting upper limit for the Average System Availability is insufficient,
further runs with incremented personnel quantities (up to a realistic limit) have to be
performed, eventually resulting in the
• Upper limit for Average System Availability for personnel quantity of 2 at Organiza-
tional Maintenance
• Upper limit for Average System Availability for personnel quantity of 3 at Organiza-
tional Maintenance
• Upper limit for Average System Availability at maximum personnel quantity at Or-
ganizational Maintenance. For our Sample System the maximum realistic personnel
quantity is assumed to be 4.
For our Sample System the resulting upper limits for the Average System
Availability for one unit of the Weapon System with a given personnel quantity and an
unlimited stock of B-Units at the location of the Organizational Maintenance are shown
in Table 8.
Table 8. PERSONNEL AT ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE
Quantity of Per-
sonnel
Maximum Average System Avail-
ability
Availability of the Mili-
tary Unit
1 ( = minimum) p = 0.813, <r = 0.0006 0.453
2 /i = 0.888, c = 0.0005 0.706
3 p = 0.893, <x = 0.0004 0.731
4 ( = maximum) fi = 0.894, a = 0.0005 0.731
Threshold 0.892 ...
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4. Evaluation of Step 2
As a general rule the smallest value for the personnel quantity, which provides
the desired numerical availability valuell, will be used for all further computations.
However, the data base used for these calculations is not exact at all - most values are
(and will be in later applications) very rough estimates. So it is the responsibility of the
experienced user, to decide about the appropriate personnel quantity. In our case quan-
tity 1 provides an Average System Availability of 0.813 versus the maximum availability
of 0.892 (equivalent to 91.1 %), quantity 2 provides 0.888 (equivalent to 99.6 %), and
quantity 3 even offers 0.893, which can be considered as being the maximum value
(again, deviations caused by simulation). For our Sample System, quantity 2 will be used
further on.
If even the realistic maximum number of repair personnel is insufficient to
achieve the desired numerical availability, the introduction of an exceptional stock of
A-Units at Organizational Maintenance might be regarded by repeating Step 2 not based
on Step 1, Run 2, but on Step 1, Run 3 or 4.
If under the assumption of an unlimited stock of B-Units a certain personnel
quantity is sufficient, this quantity can be looked upon as the maximum quantity nec-
essary. But this personnel can not utilize an unlimited stock. Consequently the unlimited
stock of B-Units at Organizational Maintenance should now be reduced to realistic val-
ues, applying the personnel quantity obtained in Step 2.
D. MATERIEL QUANTITIES AT ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE
As pointed out in II.C.2.e., stock levels will only be considered as far as they are
located at the facilities of the respective Maintenance Echelon. So now we need to know
how many units of each B-Unit should be held at each location of Organizational
Maintenance. The main reason for keeping this stock at all is the chance to increase the
Achievable Average System Availability during combat. The second time phase (as de-
fined in III.D.) becomes relevant now, and due to the output characteristics of TIGER
(summary of spares used at the end of the simulation time - see IV.B.3.4) the simulation
time horizon is now reduced to 720 hours.
1 1 See the discussion about the application of the "allowable downtimes" idea for this simu-
lation step in VI. C. 2.
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1. Step 3, Run 1 - Maximum Number of Spare Parts Used in War Scenario
Applying the personnel quantity obtained by Step 2, Run 2 or 3, we simply re-
peat the respective simulation run with decreased time horizon. The "unlimited spares"
option is kept in the input file to prevent any supply from outside. The result of this
repeated run will be the
• Upper Limit for Spare Parts needed at Organizational Maintenance in the Applied
War Scenario
If even- failure results in the replacement of the respective B-Unit by personnel
of Organizational Maintenance, this is the maximum number of spare parts needed
during the war scenario. By setting the "spares allowance" for each Assembly individ-
ually to the smallest integer being greater than the computed values, while still assuming
unlimited supply at the intermediate level DES, we will obtain from Step 3, Run 1 the
Maximum Average System Availability achievable with this stock level. Because some
parts will now be used out of the Intermediate Maintenance DES - some simulation runs
need more than the average number of spare parts - we additionally enter
LDTDES = 10 hours, the delay time to obtain spare parts from the DES.
2. Step 3, Run 2 - Consequences of Lower Allowances
With the above values being upper limits, we want to analyze the consequences
of lower allowances now. The only drawback of lower stock levels is the increased lo-
gistic delay time due to supply out of the DES of the respective Maintenance Batallion.
Instead of checking each combination of decreased allowances, we set all allowances at
Organizational Maintenance to Zero, and keep the stock level at the Intermediate
Maintenance DES unlimited, thus obtaining the
• Upper Limit for Spare Parts needed at the Intermediate Maintenance DES in the
Applied War Scenario
• Upper Limit for the Achievable Average System Availability with Zero Stock Allow-
ance at Organizational Maintenance
3. Step 3, Run 3 - Consequences of Zero Stock Allowances
In economically tough times even the necessity of any stock levels outside the
military supply line might be in doubt. To be able to present data for this situation, we
finally set both the stock level at Organizational Maintenance and at the Intermediate
Maintenance DES to Zero (setting the DES to Zero with stock of Organizational
Maintenance at upper limit will not change the results from Run 1, because only an
average of 3 or 4 Assemblies will be used from the DES). Repeating Run 2, but replacing
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the 10 hour delay (for receiving the needed Assembly from the respective DES) by a 35
hours delay (for the use of the military supply line), we obtain
• Upper Limit for the Achievable Average System Availability with Zero Stock Allow-
ance
The results of Step 3, Run 1 to 3 are summarized in Table 9.

















































0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0.477 0/0/0/0 84/30/63/104
Threshold - - 0.888 - -
4. Evaluation of Step 3
All calculations in Step 3 have been performed under the assumption that
available stocks are not refilled during the time period set by the applied war scenario.
Nevertheless unlimited supply of spare parts at the respective source was used in the
simulation runs. While this method was used in Run 1 and 2 just as a tool to obtain the
maximum stock levels at Organizational Maintenance and the Intermediate Mainte-
nance DES, the use of the unlimited supply line (see assumption stated in II.C.2.e.) was
realized in Run 3 and 4 to model the situation of Zero allowances.
Evaluating the data displayed in Table 9, consequences of cuts proposed in
budgetary discussions can be demonstrated based on analysis rather than on pure and
not necessarily wrong, but improvable intuition. Pertaining to numerical numbers for
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optimal stock levels at Organizational Maintenance and Intermediate Maintenance DES,
we need more information about the back flow of repaired components, which are used
to refill both the stock at Organizational Maintenance and the DES at Intermediate
Maintenance during the simulated time period.
E. QUANTITIES AT INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE
Entering the intermediate level, the environment is similar to that modeled for the
organizational level; however, the objects for repair are now Assemblies (B-Units). These
B-Units fail as described above, are replaced by the Organizational Maintenance, and
finally arrive some time after failure at the Intermediate Maintenance. TIGER does not
offer any links between Organizational and Intermediate Maintenance; so we can not
simulate the exact arrival times. But we can model this delay time by modeling the ar-
rival at Intermediate Maintenance at the time of failure, and covering the delay time by
ADT^ + LZ) 7s,oeA(Organiz.) + LZ)rs ,ocA(Intermed.) + ADT2 = 39, the number of hours
caused by administrative and logistic delay per repair job in Maintenance Echelon 3 (see
Table 3 on page 21) plus the delay time occurred in Organizational Maintenance while
replacing the defective B-Unit. Under the assumption of an unlimited stock of C- and
D-Units, we first have to obtain the MTBF-values of all Assemblies, and then have to
model all subordinate military units served by the Maintenance Batallion. For our
Sample System we learn from the (fictitious) ADM, that each Corps will have three Di-
visions using the new Weapon System, and that each Division will have 3 Brigades, each
commanding 2 Military Units supplied with 17 Weapon Systems each. Referring to
Table 2 on page 12, each Maintenance Batallion at the Division level will service 102
Units of the Weapon Systems.
1. Step 4, Run I - MTBF-Values for Assemblies
To obtain these MTBF-values, each Assembly is defined in a format 16 state-
ment ("TIGER system definition") and as only component under format 17 ("TIGER
subsystem definition"), while all its Subassemblies and Elements are assigned to this one
Assembly. No downtimes are applied, and any repair shop capacity is kept unlimited.
One run for each Assembly has to be performed. The following result is offered from the
first run:
• Technology determined MTBF- Values of all Assemblies
As discussed in VI.C.l., the generally accepted assumption of exponential dis-
tribution for time between failure will be used for further computations.
The results for our Sample System are shown in Table 10 on page 45.
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Table 10. MTBF-VALUES FOR ASSEMBLIES
Assembly MTBF ^ simulation A
Assembly A01 455.6 8.357 0.989
Assembly A02 563.4 8.669 0.991
Assembly A03 344.0 MTBF is given 0.986
Subsystem A 145.7 6.513 0.966
Assembly B01 161.4 7.429 0.970 (2 redundant
Assemblies in
Subsystem))
Assembly B02 511.0 8.749 0.990
Subsystem B 471.3 6.470 0.990
Assembly C01 321.1 8.088 0.985
Assembly C02 5S7.0 8.672 0.991
Assembly C03 3807500 0.000 1.000 (3 redundant
subassemblies)
Subsystem C 206.0 7.035 0.976
Assemblv D01 175.6 6.689 0.972
Assembly D02 563.7 8.995 0.991
Assembly Do
3
62S.O MTBF is given 0.992
Subsystem D . 110.3 6.073 0.956
Entire System 72.30 6.150 0.934
2. Step 4, Run 2 - Minimum Personnel Quantity, Unlimited Stock
a. Approach as Proved in Step 2
So far the new Weapon System could be treated without regarding different
fields of technology. MTBF-values are computationally independent from the used
technology, and the personnel at Organizational Maintenance could be planned across
the Fields of technology due to the way they are supposed to perform: localize defective
LRU by using BITE or straightforward traditional techniques, and replace them. At
Intermediate Maintenance however, personnel for all difTerent Fields of technology have
to be available. To show the modeling of this situation, we assume that our new Weapon
System is made up of four different Fields of technology, resulting in the use of 4 "TI-
GER specialty shops".
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We start with personnel quantity of 2 (the minimum value - see II.C.2.b.),
defining the Division in format 16 ("TIGER system definition"), consisting of UD Sum! sets
of the number of Assemblies used per System. Each Assembly is defined by its Subas-
semblies and Elements, and the MTTR for each Assembly is determined by the used
technology (see I1I.B.2. and Table 3 on page 21). The stock of C- and D-L'nits is as-
sumed to be unlimited.
For our Sample System UD Suwt = 102, resulting in 1224 "TIGER subsys-
tems"; the (assumed) MTTR for the different technologies are 7 (Subsystem A), 4 (Sub-
system B), 12 (Subsystem C) and 3 (Subsystem D). The delay time is 39 hours.
b. Dimensional Problems
At this point we are about to run into dimensional trouble with TIGER.
Table 11 compares the dimensional needs to perform Step 2, Run 2 (Personnel at Or-
ganizational Maintenance) and Step 4, Run 2 (Personnel at Intermediate Maintenance)
with the capacity of TIGER.










Number of distinct Subsystems 17 1224 31
Number of Component types 20 20 200
Number of distinct Components 68 2040 500
First of all, I want to emphasize that this is not the fault of the TIGER pro-
gram !. As pointed out in IVA., Tiger is one of the available simulation programs, and
in this application it has not been used in the way it was designed. It is moreover a sign
of the versatility of TIGER that it could be used so far in such a successful way. But
we will run into trouble even earlier, if we want to model electronic material of the
combat troops. As discussed in II.C.l., combat units have a large number of identical
equipment. If we try, for example, to obtain data for the maintenance concept for the
electronic components of a battle tank - in general an Armored Batallion has 52 battle
tanks (52 TIGER subsystems in Step 2 versus the capacity of 31 subsystems) -, we can
not use the described approach.
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c . Goal to be achieved by Intermediate Maintenance
Another problem arises in defining the optimality criterion for Step 4, Run
2. In Step 2 the goal to be achieved was clearly defined: keep the Average System
Availability at or above the numerical value required by the ADM ! We could use this
criterion if TIGER would offer the feature of refilling any stocks with components re-
paired within the Maintenance System. Due to the origin of TIGER in the Navy, the
general shop (and eventually involved special shops) repair the Weapon System as a
whole under the environment of a Three Echelon Supply System. There is no repair of
defective components performed to refill stock levels - TIGER does not model a Three
Echelon Maintenance System !
Though even if we would be able to handle the dimensional problem, this
missing link will make it impossible to proceed further on with the use of TIGER.
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VII. FURTHER APPROACH USING MODSIM
Being unable to complete our decision aid with TIGER, we now attack the problem
with the same approach, but applying the simulation language MODSIM II, which
came to my knowledge only in the last Quarter at NPS. As far as this Thesis is con-
cerned, only initial feasibility checks are performed. The development of a complete
simulation program has to be done by follow-on research.
A. REDUCED STOCHASTIC MODEL
Applying the TIGER simulation program (see VI.), we have realized that all data
necessary to solve the given problem can be obtained without modeling the entire
stochastic model shown in Figure 6 on page 20. Thus we will use a reduced stochastic
model for the remaining parts of the problem (shown in Figure 9 on page 49).
The only parts of the initial stochastic model to be considered are:





2. Organizational Maintenance with its
a. Waiting Queue
b. Repair Capacity
c. Stock of B-L'nits for replacement
3. Intermediate Maintenance with its
a. Waiting Queue
b. Repair Capacity
c. Direct Exchange Stock
d. Stock of C- and D-Units for replacement (assumably unlimited )
The sequence of steps will be the same as with TIGER, as this approach has been
proved to be adequate and successful. Upon Final development of the problem specific
MODSIM simulation program, the results for our Sample System obtained by TIGER
can be cross checked with the values obtained by MODSIM.
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Figure 9. Reduced Stochastic Model
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B. MODSIM II - GENERAL OVERVIEW
MODSIM-II is a general-purpose, procedural programming language [Ref. 21]. It
is an object-oriented language, and it performs discrete-event simulation. Like in real
world, each object has
• Attributes (fields with information about the object like MTBF for a component,
number of repair men for a maintenance facility, or allowances for stocks)
• Behaviors (methods the object can perform like failing of a component, starting a
repair by a repairman, or the fact that a stock is decreased by taking out a com-
ponent).




ASK methods, where the object is asked by another object to perform a procedure,
and where the other object waits until this procedure is finished in order to get
certain field values back. However, no simulation time elapses during the waiting
period.
TELL methods, where the object is told by another object to invoke a procedure,
which is performed independently from the "telling" object. No waiting and no re-
turning of values takes place.
Each TELL-method can
• Elapse simulation time during performance
• Wait for start of performance until being told or until a fixed point in (simulation)
time
• Send messages (ASK. TELL) to other objects during and after completion.
Objects can be created dynamically. Fields and methods of objects can be inherited
to other objects, or can be kept private. Many objects with the same behavior can be
used, distinguished by name only (e.g. in our sample system 306 Subsystems of type A,
306 Subsystems of type B etc.)., but also objects with unique behavior (e.g. the one Di-
rect Exchange Stock at Intermediate Maintenance). Some built-in objects and built-in
procedures (used as a built-in method if encapsulated in an object) can be utilized (see
[Ref. 21], Appendices D and E). Table 12 on page 51 gives an overview about the ob-
jects necessary to model our reduced stochastic model, and indicates the dimensional
ranges for each object pertaining to our Sample System.
50








properties of each Subassembly,
Assembly and Subsystem.
102x(12 + 4) =
1632
No
ElemXXXX Element-Object, defining the




properties of each unit of the
Weapon System
102 No
MaintXX Maintenance-Object, defining a
maintenance facility 17
+ 1 = 18 No
QueueXX
Queue-Object, defining a "Wait-
ing for \laintenance"-queue
(FIFO) at a maintenance facility
17 + 1 = 18 QueueObj
RepairXX
Repair-Object defining the repair






StockXX Stock-object, defining stock levels
at a maintenance facility






C. DEVELOPMENT OF MODSIM-II MODULES
MODSIM-II programs can be divided into difTerent "modules", each stored in a
separate file. Each module can be compiled separately, saving both time and resources
when minor changes have to be made. While the main program (acting like the super-
visor of the simulation) is stored in one module called MAIN MODULE, many com-
monly used variables and types can be stored in one or several DEFINITION
MODULES. Commonly used procedures additionally need to be coded in an accompa-
nying IMPLEMENTATION MODULE. Each Object can also be defined and coded in
a separate pair of DEFINITION MODULE and IMPLEMENTATION MODULE.
To begin a MODSIM simulation, the best approach is the definition of all variables and
types, that are used in several objects, in an initial DEFINITION MODULE "Global",
followed by the definition and implementation of all necessary objects with their attri-
butes and the methods they can perform.
51
1. Global Variables and Types
This is the place to define all fixed parameters listed in Table 3 on page 21.
Pertaining to the variable parameters listed in Table 4 on page 22, we can define the
parameters R2 , RiD and RiC , which will be controlled by the future user to obtain the re-
spective value for the decision criterion, the Achievable Average System Availability (see
also VI.C), and DTXmix , which will be known (or simply set to zero) at the begin of the
decision process.
In the Type Declaration the known but fixed values for different object fields
are set. As an example, the field "Status", defined in Component-Object, is limited to the
values "operating", "pausing", "broken" and "standby". Declaring this Type in "Global"
ensures that no other value for "Status" can be introduced anywhere else, and avoids the
explicit declaration in each object.
The DEFINITION MODULE "Global" is shown in Appendix C.
2. Objects of Weapon System
We will begin the definition of objects with those needed to model the weapon
system. The most general module is the Component-Object, having all fields and meth-
ods most parts of a technical system have as main characteristics. This Component-
Object has the fields
• Name - the identifier of the defined component
• IndentLevel - indicates the indenture level of the respective component (Subsystem,
Assembly, Subassembly or Element)
• Technology - indicates main field of electronic technology used in the defined com-
ponent
• MasterComponent - name of component in next higher indenture level the defined
component is part of
• Tenants - name of components in next lower indenture level which reside inside the
object (if any)
• Status - indicates if object is operating, pausing, broken or in stand-by
• BrokenParts - names of those components at each indenture level that are broken
and need to be replaced at the appropriate maintenance facility
• StandByAvail - indicates if there is a ready-to-start stand-by-component available
and is able to perform the following methods:
• ASK METHOD Break - component is informed about an occurred failure within
its tenants, breaks and passes message and names of broken parts on to its master
component
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• ASK METHOD Pause - each component is informed about an occurred failure
within its Weapon System, and pauses in its aging process until its Weapon System
is in operating status again
• TELL METHOD UpAgain - each component is told to resume operational status
The Element-Object inherits all fields and methods of Component-Object. It has
four additional fields
• mean - Mean Time Between Failure
• alpha - shape parameter a for Gamma distribution of time between failures
• TimeToFailure - period in simulation time until component fails next time
• Discard - indicator for irreparable component
and two additional methods.
• TELL METHOD ComputeNextFail - the value for field TimeToFailure is com-
puted
• ASK METHOD Fail - element is told to fail, and passes message and its own name
upwards to its master component
The System-Object inherits all fields of Component-Object, and has four addi-
tional fields
• StartDownTime - records the point in time at which system failed
• SumOfDowiiTimes - adds (SimulationTime - StartDownTime) to
SumOfDownTimes at that point in time at which system returns to operational
status
• AverageAvailability - keeps track of the average availability value for its weapon
system in the simulation
• MilitaryUnit - name of military unit to which the system belongs,
has one additional method
• ASK METHOD DownTime - system is asked to report SumOfDownTimes
and one method overriding the method with the same name in Component-Object:
• ASK METHOD Break (OVERRIDE) - system is informed about an occurred
internal failure and orders all of its still operable tenants to pause in the aging
process
These three objects are defined and implemented in the module
"WeaponSystem". The "DEFINITION MODULE WeaponSystem" and the "IMPLE-
MENTATION MODULE WeaponSystem" are both shown in Appendix D.
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3. Objects of Maintenance System
After the definition of the objects needed to model the weapon system, now the
objects needed to model the maintenance system are defined. The Organizational-
Maintenance-Object has the fields
Name - the identifier of the defined Organizational Maintenance Facility
NumberRepairObj - the number of Repair-Objects within the Maintenance Facility
IdleRepairFacilities - the number of idle Repair-Objects at a point in time
IdleFacility - the idle Repair-Object which will be assigned a job next
Stock - the list of stock levels for all available spare parts
JobQueue - the "waiting for maintenance"-queue
ComponentToReplace - the component which will be assigned next to an idle
Repair-Object
ResponsiblelntMaintFac - the name of the next higher Intermediate Maintenance
Facility
and is able to perform the following methods:
• ASK METHOD OrgQueueJob - adds a failed Subsystem to the "waiting for
maintenance"-queue of an Organizational Maintenance Facility
• ASK METHOD ReportOfldle - object is informed about a Repair-Object having
become idle
• TELL METHOD Assign - assigns a repair job to the asking Repair-Object
• ASK METHOD SendToRepair - object is informed that a replaced Subsystem has
to be sent to the respective Intermediate Maintenance Facility
The Intermediate-Maintenance-Object inherits all fields and methods of
Organizational-Maintenance-Object. It has one additional method
• ASK METHOD IntQueueJob - adds a failed Component to the "waiting for
maintenance"-queue of an Intermediate Maintenance Facility
and one method overriding the method with the same name in Organizational-
Maintenance-Object:
• TELL METHOD Assign - assigns a repair job to the asking Repair-Object, too,
but applies different administrative and logistic delay times
These two objects are defined and implemented in the module "Maintenance".
The "DEFINITION MODULE Maintenance" and the "IMPLEMENTATION MOD-
ULE Maintenance" are both shown in Appendix E.
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The Repair-Object is defined independently from the Maintenance-Object, and
has the following fields:
Name - the identifier of the defined Repair-Object
MaintUnit - the Maintenance-Object the Repair-Object belongs to
MaintLevel - Maintenance Echelon at which jobs are performed at this Repair-
Object
• Qual - indicates qualification of Repair-Object for certain fields of electronic tech-
nology.
Furthermore, Repair-Object has one method:
• TELL METHOD Fix - object is told to perform repair
For the Queue-Object, which will line up and release maintenance jobs following
the First-In-First-Out (FIFO) policy, the built-in QueueObj can be utilized.
The Stock-Object just has to keep track of the number of a certain component
in stock and of the number of eventual reorders that can not be satisfied upon occur-
rence. It does not have to follow any policy like FIFO or LIFO. It fields are
NameOfComp - name of respective Component-Object
NameOfMaintObj - name of Maintenance-Object where Stock-Object is located
Allowance - maximum number of components in stock
Level - number of components actually in stock at a point in time
MaxReOrder - maximum number of reorders occurring during simulation run,
and its methods are
• ASK METHOD OffStock - decreases actual stock level by one
• ASK METHOD ToStock - increases actual stock level by one
• ASK METHOD TrackReOrder - keeps track of the reorders.
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VIII. EVALUATION AND SUMMARY
A. PURPOSE OF THE DECISION AID
As stated in Chapter I, the main purpose of the decision aid to be developed is ob-
taining reasonable and, as far as achievable at the relevant point of time within the
Weapon Acquisition Process, reliable numbers for personal and material quantities,
which have to be entered into the respective Acquisition Decision Memoranda (ADM).
B. GENERAL SHORTCOME OF THE DECISION AID
Though this decision aid tries to model reality as close as possible, its results are
only as good as the quality of the input data - a characteristic known as "garbage in,
garbage out". Due to the origin of the MTBF-data for all involved Components, the aid
can not offer absolutely reliable results. To avoid poor results and a feeling of dissatis-
faction on the user's side, utmost effort has to be concentrated in the building of the data
base for MTBF- and MTTR-values (see also VIII.E.l.b.).
C. ACHIEVEMENT BY TIGER
Exploiting the multiple features of an introduced simulation program like TIGER,
and intelligently varying the structure of the input data, an experienced user can obtain
the following numbers without any modifications to the code of the program (see
Chapter VI):
Upper limit for Average System Availability under consideration of technology and
general maintenance system
Tactically increased upper limit for A verage System A vailability
Technology determined absolute upper limit for Average System Availability
Tactically increased technology determined absolute upper limit for Average System
A vailability
MTBF-valuesfor one unit of the System under each of the conditions stated above
Technology determined MTBF-Values of all Subsystems
Upper limit for Average System Availability at minimum personnel quantity at Or-
ganizational Maintenance
Upper limit for A verage System A vailability for personnel quantity of 2 and more at
Organizational Maintenance
Upper limit for Average System Availability at maximum personnel quantity at Or-
ganizational Maintenance
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• Upper Limit for Spare Parts needed at Organizational Maintenance in the Applied
War Scenario
• Upper Limit for Spare Parts needed at the Intermediate Maintenance DES in the
Applied War Scenario
• Upper Limit for the Achievable Average System Availability with Zero Stock Allow-
ance at Organizational Maintenance
• Upper Limit for the Achievable Average System Availability with Zero Stock Allow-
ance at all
• Technology determined MTBF- Values of all Assemblies
D. PROBLEMS UNDER TIGER
As shown in Chapter VI, this approach is usable and successful for new Electronic
Weapon Systems, as long as the following limitations are applicable:
1. Weapon System will be repaired only in Maintenance Echelon 2 (Organizational
Maintenance)
2. The maximum number of Weapon System Units within the responsibility of one
Organizational Maintenance Facility does not exceed 31.
These limitations are met by many Weapon Systems to be deployed in the combat
support and communication forces. They are definitely exceeded by specific material in
the combat support and communication forces, and by most electronic material de-
ployed within the combat forces (see II.C.l.).
The other limitations shown in Table 1 1 on page 46 (maximum number of Com-
ponent types = 200, maximum number of distinct Components = 500) generally will
not impose any problem, because only the rough design structure of the new system is
known at the point in time this decision aid will be applied. If the information available
exceeds these limits, the project will have proceeded in the acquisition process, and other
tools 1- will be applicable and more appropriate.
E. NECESSARY FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
To cover all kind of weapon systems the full scale development of the indicated
MODSIM-II-program is inevitable. Three major tasks have to be performed.
12 like Logistic Support Analysis (LSA) [Ref. 1J
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1. Development of Data Base
a. Weapon System Data
These data are no problem, they can be obtained from the existing design
papers.
b. Component Data
The most work intensive task (see VIII. B.) will be the development of the
data base for MTBF- and MTTR-data for components defined by their functional
characteristics. The evaluation of data for deployed weapon systems can not be per-
formed on a routine basis; it requires experienced personnel with both a background in
engineering science, the weapon acquisition process, and in the actual maintenance
process ai the different military maintenance facilities. As a rough estimate, at least one
man-year is necessary to build this data base, and a continuing maintenance is manda-
tory.
c. Deployment Data
These data are no problem, they can be obtained from the Mission Need
Statement (MNS) or an already existing ADM.
d. Maintenance System Data
The fixed parameters shown in Table 3 on page 21 are a reasonable, but
arbitrary estimate of the real world situation. In case of insufficient other information
they can be applied without causing major deviations. A thorough evaluation of existing
data might offer more exact data, which might be used to randomize the different delay
times in order to introduce even more realism into the model. As a rough estimate, three
man-months are necessary to build this part of the data base, and a continuing mainte-
nance is advisable.
e. Limitations in Personal and Material Quantities
These limitations are not easily obtained, because all personnel involved will
try to hide eventually existing realistic values for reasons beyond a pure technical point
of view. Like the differentiation of component features based on the manufacturing
contractor (see III.B.3.), irrational behavior has to be taken into account, once more
pointing to the need for experienced users.
2. Development of a Semi-Automated Decision Aid
The procedure shown in Chapter VI in the application of TIGER was a step-
by-step off-line process. Each simulation run had to be initiated by the user, though the
sequence of input steps was predetermined. Interactions between the user and an on-line
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simulation program are only necessary at the following points (Step numbers and Run
numbers refer to Chapter VI):
• After completion of Run 1 to determine the need for the relaxation of tactical re-
quirements and 'or the need for an exceptional spare stock of A-Units at the lo-
cation of the Organizational Maintenance
• After completion of Run 2 to determine the number of repair personnel at Organ-
izational Maintenance sufficient to achieve the required Average System Avail-
ability
• After completion of a newly designed Run 3. Run 3 will offer combinations of pos-
sible numbers of spare parts in stock at Organizational Maintenance (B-Units) and
in stock at Intermediate Maintenance - both in the Direct Exchange Stock (DES,
B-Units) and in the general stock (C- and D-Units) -
,
necessary to offer the Or-
ganizational Maintenance "unlimited-like" supply. The user has to determine those
combinations that seem to be realistic, and has to start a newly designed Run 4,
which finally will offer the number of repair personnel at Intermediate Mainte-
nance, necessary to refill the stock levels, decided upon after Run 3.
So the program to be developed in MODSIM can be structured as a four-step
program, asking for a decision by the user after each step. So no decision - while using
the decision aid - is made by the program. The program only assists the user with data
based on an analysis, so eventually gaining acceptance even from decision makers who
might feel uncomfortable with the idea that their intuitive ideas can be performed by a
computer.
3. Integration of Specific Features
The scope of subtleties that can be integrated into the final decision aid is nearly
infinite. A trade-off between reality and applicability has to be made in order to prevent
excessive run times or ridiculous results.
Just a few specialties seem to be reasonable. Though this listing can not be final,
the following features (partially also included in the TIGER program) should be in-
cluded in any further development:
• Allowable Downtimes - this feature should be available both on the Subsystem- and
the Assembly-level
• Stand-By - this feature should be available on all indenture levels
• Availability of Military Unit - enlarging the scope of availability data might increase
the acceptance also in the military combat community
• Additional consideration of fractional personnel - without entering the discussion
about the realization of a 0.4-person this feature offers invaluable information
about the possibility to combine two "fractional" repair persons for 2 different
small systems with comparable technology to one "allround-repair-person" for both
svstems.
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APPENDIX A. SAMPLE INPUT FILE FOR "TIGER"
This appendix contains the second input file for the TIGER Reliability Computer
Program (Step 1, Run 2). The reasoning for this input file is described in detail in IV.B.2.
RUN 1/2: NO STOCK OF A-UNITS; ALLOWABLE DOWNTIMES
250 1. 28 1
1 175. 1 15055.
51000000000000001
11SUBASSEMBLY_A01A 1327. 5. 3
12SUBASSEMBLY_A01B 664. 5. 9
13SUBASSEMBLY_A02A 841. 5. 9
14ELEMENT.A0201 1523. 5. 9
15ASSEMBLY_A03 344. 5. 9
21ELEMENT_B0101 225. 5. 1
23ELEMENT_B0102 534. 5. 9
25ELEMENT_B0201 866. 5. 7
26SUBASSEMBLY_B02A 1167. 5. 5
31ELEMENT_C0101 544. 5. 9
32ELEMENT_C0102 732. 5. 7
33SUBASSEMBLY_C02A 1322. 5. 9
34SUBASSEMBLY_C02B 1003. 5. 4
35SUBASSEMBLY_C03A 210. 5. 9
41SUBASSEMBLY_D01A 375. 5. 5
42SUBASSEMBLYJD01B 445. 5. 9
43SUBASSEMBLY_D01C 1127. 5. 8
44SUBASSEMBLY_D02A 554. 5. 5
45ELEMENT_D0201 1303 5. 3




























2 510 11 12
2 520 13 14
1 530 15
3 501 510 520 530
2 611 21 23
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2 612 22 24
1 610 611 612
612 611
2 620 25 26
2 601 610 620
2 710 31 32
2 720 33 34




3 701 710 720 730
3 810 41 42 43
2 820 44 45
1 830 46
3 801 810 820 830
4 999 501 601 701 801
* * * End of Input -File * * *
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APPENDIX B. 'TIGERS-OUTPUT FOR SAMPLE INPUT FILE
This appendix contains the output for the sample input file shown in Appendix A.
The evaluation of this output is described in detail in IV.B.2.
**** TIGER SIMULATION FOR RELIABILITY, MAINTAINABILITY, AND AVAILABILITY ****
RUN 1/2: NO STOCK OF A-UNITS; ALLOWABLE DOWNTIMES
I I I 1 1 I I I I I 1 I I I I 1 I I I TIGER 8. 20 1 I I 1 I I 1 I I I I I I 1 I I 1 I 1 1
I I I I I NAVSEA 05MR WASHINGTON, DC 20362-5101 MIN I
I I I I I I 1 I ii 1 1 M I I I (202) 692-2150 I I I I I I I I 1 I I I I I I I I I
INTIGER
(INPUT ECHO)
INPUT DATA HIGH VALUES
DURATION TYPES GROUPS EQUIPS PH-SEQ PH-TYP TRIALS
15230. 00 46 999 46 2 1 250
OUTTIGER PAGE
RELIABILITY FOR PHASE 1, 1 0.924
AVERAGE AVAILABILITY
FOR PHASE 1, 1 0.998
INSTANT AVAILABILITY
AT BEGINNING OF PHASE 1.000
RELIABILITY THRU PHASE
AVG. AVAIL. THRU PHASE
TIME (END OF PHASE)
INSTANT AVAILABILITY






RELIABILITY FOR PHASE 1, 2 0.000
AVERAGE AVAILABILITY
FOR PHASE 1,2 0. 933
INSTANT AVAILABILITY
AT BEGINNING OF PHASE 0. 984
FINAL SUMMARY STATS
RELIABILITY THRU PHASE 1 0. 000
AVG. AVAIL. THRU PHASE 1 0. 934
TIME (END OF PHASE) 15230.000
INSTANT AVAILABILITY
AT END OF PHASE 0. 920
PAGE
SYSTEM FIGURES OF MERIT AFTER
250 MISSION TRIALS
AT END OF MISSION:
RELIABILITY
RELIABILITY LOWER PRECISION LIMIT
(BASED ON STANDARD DEVIATION CRITERIA)
INSTANTANEOUS AVAILABILITY
MEAN STANDARD DEVIATION






AVERAGE AVAILABILITY 0. 934 0.000
ESTIMATES OF LONG-TERM VALUES:
MEAN TIME BETWEEN FAILURES





MISSION PERFORMANCE (FAILURE &. REPAIR INFORMATION




MEAN ACTIVE REPAIR TIME
MEAN TIME TO FIRST FAILURE
72.3 6. 150




TOTAL NO. OF SYSTEM FAILURES = 49152
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TABLE FAILURES NUM PAGE
EQUIP FAILURE SUMMARY BY EQUIPMENT NUMBER
EQUIP. NO. TYPE NO. TOTAL EQUIP. AVG. NO. FAILURES FGC/EIC
FAILURES PER MISSION
11 11 2783 11. 132
12 12 5586 22. 344
13 13 4430 17. 720
14 14 2381 9.524
15 15 10792 43. 168
21 21 16497 65. 988
22 21 516 2. 064
23 23 6900 27. 600
24 23 85 0. 340
25 25 4291 17. 164
26 26 3122 12.488
31 31 6870 27.480
32 32 5065 20.260
33 33 2742 10.968
34 34 3707 14. 828
35 35 17652 70.608
36 35 294 1. 176
37 35 297 1. 188
41 41 9966 39.864
42 42 8317 33. 268
43 43 3268 13.072
44 44 6738 26.952
46 46 5991 23.964
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128290 513. 158
TABLE FAILURES TYPE PAGE
EQUIP FAILURE SUMMARY BY EQUIPMENT TYPE NUMBER
TYPE TOTAL EQUIP. AVG. NO. FAILURES MAINTENANCE STD. DEV. FGC/EIC
FAILURES PER MISSION HOURS MAINT. HRS
11 2783 11. 132
12 5586 22. 344
13 4430 17. 720
14 2381 9.524
15 10792 43. 168
21 17013 68.052
23 6985 27.940




33 2742 10. 968
34 3707 14. 828
35 18243 72.972
41 9966 39. 864
42 8317 33.268














































SUMMARY OF SPARES USED
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ORGANIZATION SPARES INTERMEDIATE SPARES DEPOT SPARES
SPARE TOTAL USE PER TOTAL USE PER
TYPE STOCK USED MISSION STOCK USED MISSION
1 90000 0. 000 90000 0. 000
2 90000 0. 000 90000 0. 000
3 90000 0. 000 90000 0.000
4 90000 0. 000 90000 0.000
5 90000 0. 000 90000 0. 000
6 90000 0. 000 90000 0. 000
7 90000 0. 000 90000 0. 000
8 90000 0. 000 90000 0. 000
9 90000 0. 000 90000 0. 000
10 90000 0. 000 90000 0. 000
11 90000 2783 11. 132 90000 0.000
12 90000 5586 22. 344 90000 0. 000
13 90000 4430 17. 720 90000 0.000
14 90000 2381 9. 524 90000 0. 000
15 90000 10792 43. 168 90000 0. 000
16 90000 0. 000 90000 0. 000
17 90000 0. 000 90000 0. 000
18 90000 0. 000 90000 0. 000
19 90000 0. 000 90000 0. 000
20 90000 0. 000 90000 0.000
21 90000 17013 68. 052 90000 0.000
22 90000 0. 000 90000 0.000
23 90000 6985 27. 940 90000 0. 000
24 90000 0. 000 90000 0.000
25 90000 4291 17. 164 90000 0. 000
26 90000 3122 12. 488 90000 0.000
27 90000 0. 000 90000 0.000
28 90000 0. 000 90000 o
•
0. 000






























































30 90000 0.000 90000 0.000 90000 0.000
31 90000 6870 27.480 90000 0. 000 90000 0.000
32 90000 5065 20. 260 90000 0.000 90000 0.000
33 90000 2742 10.968 90000 0. 000 90000 0. 000
34 90000 3707 14. 828 90000 0.000 90000 0. 000
35 90000 18243 72.972 90000 0. 000 90000 0.000
36 90000 0. 000 90000 0.000 90000 0.000
37 90000 0.000 90000 0. 000 90000 0.000
38 90000 0. 000 90000 0. 000 90000 0. 000
39 90000 0.000 90000 0.000 90000 0.000
40 90000 0.000 90000 0.000 90000 0.000
41 90000 9966 39. 864 90000 0.000 90000 0.000
42 90000 8317 33. 268 90000 0. 000 90000 0.000
43 90000 3268 13.072 90000 0. 000 90000 0.000
44 90000 6738 26. 952 90000 0. 000 90000 0. 000
45 90000 0. 000 90000 0. 000 90000 0. 000
46 90000 5991 23. 964 90000 0.000 90000 0. 000
TABLE UNAVA NUM PAGE
RUN 1/2: NO STOCK OF A-UNITS; ALLOWABLE DOWNTIMES




NAME NUMBER HRS UNAVA PERCENT TYPE NO. FGC/EIC
ASSEMBLY_A03 52510. 1094 0.0138 20.81 15 15
ELEMENT_C0101 33285.5586 0. 0087 13. 19 31 31
SUBASSEMBLY_A01B 27054. 7500 0.0071 10. 72 12 12
ELEMENT_C0102 24513.2500 0.0064 9.71 32 32
SUBASSEMBLY_A02A 21490. 1719 0.0056 8.51 13 13
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ELEMENT_B0201 20735. 0859 0. 0054 8. 22 25 25
SUBASSEMBLY_C02B 17946. 0820 0. 0047 7. 11 34 34
SUBASSEMBLY_B02A 15077. 8633 0. 0040 5. 97 26 26
SUBASSEMBLY_A01A 13427. 8672 0. 0035 5. 32 11 11
SUBASSEMBLY_C02A 13275. 4180 0. 0035 5. 26 33 33
ELEMENT_A0201 11482. 1250 0. 0030 4. 55 14 14
ELEMENT_B0101 620. 3950 0. 0002 0. 25 21 22
ELEMENT_B0101 522. 2812 0. 0001 0. 21 21 21
ELEMENT_B0102 209. 1828 0. 0001 0. 08 23 23
ELEMENT_B0102 108. 4651 0. 0000 0. 04 23 24
SUBASSEMBLY_C03A 4. 1523 0. 0000 0. 00 35 35
SUBASSEMBLY_C03A 4. 1523 0. 0000 0. 00 35 36
SUBASSEMBLY_C03A 4. 1523 0. 0000 0. 00 35 37
TABLE UNAVA TYPE PAGE
RUN 1/2: NO STOCK OF A-UNITS; ALLOWABLE DOWNTIMES














NUMBER HRS UNAVA PERCENT TYPE FGC/EIC
52510. 1094 0.0138 20. 81 15
33285.5586 0. 0087 13. 19 31
27054. 7500 0. 0071 10. 72 12
24513.2500 0.0064 9. 71 32
21490. 1719 0.0056 8.51 13
20735. 0859 0. 0054 8.22 25
17946. 0820 0. 0047 7. 11 34
15077.8633 0. 0040 5.97 26
13427.8672 0.0035 5.32 11
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SUBASSEMBLY_C02A 13275. 4180 0.0035 5. 26 33
ELEMENT_A0201 11482. 1250 0.0030 4. 55 14
ELEMENT_B0101 1142. 6763 0.0003 0. 45 21
ELEMENTJ30102 317. 6477 0. 0001 0. 13 23
SUBASSEMBLY_C03A 12. 4570 0. 0000 0. 00 35
TABLE UNREL NUM PAGE
RUN 1/2: NO STOCK OF A-UNITS; ALLOWABLE DOWNTIMES
CRITICAL EQUIPMENT BY EQUIPMENT NUMBER FOR FULL SYSTEM
UNRELIABILITY AND
PERCENT OF MISSION FAILURES
DESCRIPTION NO. UNREL PERCENT EQUIP EQUIP FGC/EIC
FAILURES TYPE NO.
ASSEMBLY_A03 171. 0. 6840 68. 40 15 15
ELEMENT_C0101 22. 0. 0880 8. 80 31 31
ELEM£NT_C0102 13. 0. 0520 5. 20 32 32
SUBASSEMBLY_C02B 10. 0. 0400 4. 00 34 34
SUBASSEMBLY_A01B 7. 0. 0280 2. 80 12 12
SUBASSEMBLY.A01A 7. 0. 0280 2. 80 11 11
ELEMENT_B0201 6. 0. 0240 2. 40 25 25
ELEMENT_B0101 4. 0. 0160 1. 60 21 21
SUBASSEMBLY_A02A 4. 0. 0160 1. 60 13 13
ELEMENT_B0101 4. 0. 0160 1. 60 21 22
SUBASSEMBLY B02A 2. 0. 0080 0. 80 26 26
TOTAL NO. MISSION TRIALS = 250
TOTAL NO. MISSION FAILURES FOR FULL SYSTEM = 250
TABLE UNREL TYPE PAGE
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RUN 1/2: NO STOCK OF A -UNITS; ALLOWABLE DOWNTIMES
CRITICAL EQUIPMENT BY EQUIPMENT TYPE FOR FULL SYSTEM
UNRELIABILITY AND
PERCENT OF MISSION FAILURES
DESCRIPTION NO. UNREL PERCENT EQUIP
FAILURES TYPE
ASSEMBLY_A03 171. 0. 6840 68. 40 15
ELEMENT_C0101 22. 0. 0880 8. 80 31
ELEMENT_C0102 13. 0. 0520 5. 20 32
SUBASSEMBLY_C02B 10. 0. 0400 4. 00 34
ELEMENT_B0101 8. 0. 0320 3. 20 21
SUBASSEMBLY_A01B 7. 0. 0280 2. 80 12
SUBASSEMBLY_A01A 7. 0. 0280 2. 80 11
ELEMENT_B0201 6. 0. 0240 2. 40 25
SUBASSEMBLY_A02A 4. 0. 0160 1. 60 13
SUBASSEMBLY B02A 2. 0. 0080 0. 80 26
TOTAL NO. MISSION TRIALS = 250
TOTAL NO. MISSION FAILURES FOR FULL SYSTEM = 250
TABLE UNAVA NUM PAGE
RUN 1/2: NO STOCK OF A-UNITS; ALLOWABLE DOWNTIMES





NAME NUMBER HRS UNAVA PERCENT TYPE NO. FGC/EIC
ASSEMBLY_A03 53396.4375 0. 0140 41.62 15 15
SUBASSEMBLY_A01B 27526. 8477 0. 0072 21.46 12 12
SUBASSEMBLY_A02A 21859. 8164 0.0057 17.04 13 13
SUBASSEMBLY_A01A 13680. 1523 0. 0036 10. 66 11 11
ELEMENT_A0201 11710. 7852 0. 0031 9. 13 14 14
TABLE UNAVA TYPE PAGE
RUN 1/2: NO STOCK OF A-UNITS; ALLOWABLE DOWNTIMES




NAME NUMBER HRS UNAVA PERCENT TYPE
ASSEMBLY_A03 53396.4375 0. 0140 41.62 15
SUBASSEMBLY_A01B 27526. 8477 0. 0072 21.46 12
SUBASSEMBLY_A02A 21859. 8164 0. 0057 17.04 13
SUBASSEMBLY.AOIA 13680. 1523 0.0036 10. 66 11
ELEMENT_A0201 11710. 7852 0. 0031 9. 13 14
TABLE UNREL NUM PAGE
RUN 1/2: NO STOCK OF A-UNITS; ALLOWABLE DOWNTIMES
CRITICAL EQUIPMENT BY EQUIPMENT NUMBER FOR SUBSYSTEM_A
UNRELIABILITY AND





ASSEMBLY_A03 218.0 0.8720 87. 20
SUBASSEMBLY_A01B 16.0 0. 0640 6. 40
SUBASSEMBLY_A01A 9.0 0. 0360 3. 60
SUBASSEMBLY A02A 7.0 0.0280 2. 80










TOTAL NO. MISSION TRIALS = 250
TOTAL NO. MISSION FAILURES FOR SUBSYSTEM_A = 250
TABLE UNREL TYPE PAGE
RUN 1/2: NO STOCK OF A-UNITS; ALLOWABLE DOWNTIMES
CRITICAL EQUIPMENT BY EQUIPMENT TYPE FOR SUBSYSTEM_A
UNRELIABILITY AND





ASSEMBLY_A03 218. 0. 8720 87. 20 15
SUBASSEMBLY_A01B 16.0 0. 0640 6. 40 12
SUBASSEMBLY_A01A 9.0 0. 0360 3. 60 11
SUBASSEMBLY A02A 7.0 0. 0280 2. 80 13
TOTAL NO. MISSION TRIALS = 250
TOTAL NO. MISSION FAILURES FOR SUBSYSTEM.A = 250
TABLE UNAVA NUM PAGE
RUN 1/2: NO STOCK OF A-UNITS; ALLOWABLE DOWNTIMES
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NAME NUMBER HRS UNAVA PERCENT TYPE NO. FGC/EIC
ELEMENT_B0201 21394.3789 0. 0056 55.52 25 25
SUBASSEMBLY_B02A 15552. 7617 0.0041 40. 36 26 26
ELEMENT_B0101 632. 1204 0. 0002 1.64 21 22
ELEMENT_B0101 533. 2466 0. 0001 1. 38 21 21
ELEMENT_B0102 213.4900 0. 0001 0. 55 23 23
ELEMENT_B0102 112. 0133 0. 0000 0. 29 23 24
TABLE UNAVA TYPE PAGE
RUN 1/2: NO STOCK OF A-UNITS; ALLOWABLE DOWNTIMES




NAME NUMBER HRS UNAVA PERCENT TYPE FGC/EIC
ELEMENT_B0201 21394. 3789 0. 0056 55.52 25
SUBASSEMBLY_B02A 15552. 7617 0.0041 40.36 26
ELEMENT_B0101 1165. 3669 0. 0003 3.02 21
ELEMENT_B0102 325.5032 0. 0001 0. 84 23
TABLE UNREL NUM PAGE
RUN 1/2: NO STOCK OF A-UNITS; ALLOWABLE DOWNTIMES
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CRITICAL EQUIPMENT BY EQUIPMENT NUMBER FOR SUBSYSTEM_B
UNRELIABILITY AND
PERCENT OF MISSION FAILURES
DESCRIPTION NO. UNREL PERCENT EQUIP EQUIP
FAILURES TYPE NO.
ELEMENT_B0201 164.0 0. 6560 65.60 25 25
SUBASSEMBLY_B02A 67. 0. 2680 26.80 26 26
ELEMENT_B0101 9.5 0. 0380 3. 80 21 22
ELEMENT_B0101 7.0 0. 0280 2. 80 21 21
ELEMENT BO 102 2.5 0. 0100 1. 00 23 23
TOTAL NO. MISSION TRIALS = 250
TOTAL NO. MISSION FAILURES FOR SUBSYSTEM_B = 250
TABLE UNREL TYPE PAGE
RUN 1/2: NO STOCK OF A-UNITS; ALLOWABLE DOWNTIMES
CRITICAL EQUIPMENT BY EQUIPMENT TYPE FOR SUBSYSTEM_B
UNRELIABILITY AND
PERCENT OF MISSION FAILURES
DESCRIPTION NO. UNREL PERCENT EQUIP FGC/EIC
FAILURES TYPE
ELEMENT_B0201 164. 0. 6560 65. 60 25
SUBASSEMBLY_B02A 67. 0. 2680 26. 80 26
ELEMENT_B0101 16. 5 0. 0660 6. 60 21
ELEMENT BO 102 2. 5 0. 0100 1. 00 23
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TOTAL NO. MISSION TRIALS = 250
TOTAL NO. MISSION FAILURES FOR SUBSYSTEM_B = 250
TABLE UNAVA NUM PAGE
RUN 1/2: NO STOCK OF A-UNITS; ALLOWABLE DOWNTIMES




NAME NUMBER HRS UNAVA PERCENT TYPE NO.
ELEMENT_C0101 34082. 2031 0.0090 37. 35 31 31
ELEMENT_C0102 25083. 2070 0. 0066 27. 49 32 32
SUBASSEMBLY_C02B 18350. 3398 0. 0048 20. 11 34 34
SUBASSEMBLY_C02A 13590. 7812 0. 0036 14. 89 33 33
SUBASSEMBLY_C03A 4. 1523 0. 0000 0. 00 35 35
SUBASSEMBLY_C03A 4. 1523 0. 0000 0. 00 35 36
SUBASSEMBLY_C03A 4. 1523 0. 0000 0. 00 35 37
TABLE UNAVA TYPE PAGE
FGC/EIC
RUN 1/2: NO STOCK OF A-UNITS; ALLOWABLE DOWNTIMES
CRITICAL EQUIPMENT BY EQUIPMENT TYPE FOR SUBSYSTEM_C
UNAVAILABILITY AND
PERCENT OF UNAVAILABILITY




ELEMENT_C0101 34082. 2031 0.0090 37. 35 31
ELEMENT_C0102 25083. 2070 0.0066 27. 49 32
SUBASSEMBLY_C02B 18350. 3398 0. 0048 20. 11 34
SUBASSEMBLY_C02A 13590. 7812 0. 0036 14. 89 33
SUBASSEMBLY_C03A 12. 4570 0.0000 0. 01 35
TABLE UNREL NUM PAGE
RUN 1/2: NO STOCK OF A-UNITS; ALLOWABLE DOWNTIMES
CRITICAL EQUIPMENT BY EQUIPMENT NUMBER FOR SUBSYSTEM_C
UNRELIABILITY AND
PERCENT OF MISSION FAILURES
DESCRIPTION NO. UNREL PERCENT EQUIP EQUIP
FAILURES TYPE NO.
ELEMENT_C0101 146. 0.5840 58.40 31 31
ELEMENT_C0102 61. 0. 2440 24.40 32 32
SUBASSEMBLY_C02B 39. 0. 1560 15.60 34 34
SUBASSEMBLY C02A 4. 0. 0160 1.60 33 33
TOTAL NO. MISSION TRIALS = 250
TOTAL NO. MISSION FAILURES FOR SUBSYSTEM_C = 250
TABLE UNREL TYPE PAGE
RUN 1/2: NO STOCK OF A-UNITS; ALLOWABLE DOWNTIMES
CRITICAL EQUIPMENT BY EQUIPMENT TYPE FOR SUBSYSTEM_C
UNRELIABILITY AND






ELEMENT_C0101 146. 0.5840 58.40 31
ELEMENT_C0102 61.0 0. 2440 24.40 32
SUBASSEMBLY_C02B 39. 0. 1560 15.60 34
SUBASSEMBLY_C02A 4. 0. 0160 1.60 33
TOTAL NO. MISSION TRIALS = 250
TOTAL NO. MISSION FAILURES FOR SUBSYSTEM.C = 250
TABLE REDM PAGE
RESTRICTED ERLANG DISTRIBUTION MODEL
MTBMF =
2ND MOMENT ABOUT ORIGIN =
299. 23
97785. 12
SHAPE = 11 Ml = 17.26 M2 = 28.20
R-TIGER R-THEO DIFF DIFSQ
175.00 0.924
AFB208I VFNTH : PROGRAM INTERRUPT
0.936 -.012 0.000
FLOATING-POINT UNDERFLOW EXCEPTION
(SEE V. B. 5. )
STANDARD CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN. EXECUTION CONTINUING.
15230.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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AVG ABS DIFF=0. 006 MAX ABS DIFF=0. 012 SQUARESSUM=0. 000
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APPENDIX C. MODSIM-II-CODE FOR MODULE GLOBAL
This appendix contains successfully compiled code for the definition of those vari-
ables and types, that are used in all further definition and implementation modules. The
program part shown is the DEFINITION MODULE "Global", which does not need an
accompanying IMPLEMENTATION MODULE, because no procedure or method has
to be defined.
DEFINITION MODULE Global;
FROM GrpMod IMPORT QueueObj;
FROM Debug IMPORT DebugStreara;
VAR






























= (System, Aunit, Bunit, Cunit, Dunit);
= (operating, pausing, broken, standby);
= (Organizational, Intermediate);
= (Electronic, Optronic, Communication,









APPENDIX D. MODSIM-II-CODE FOR MODULE WEAPONSVSTEM
This appendix contains successfully compiled code for the three objects necessary




The first program part shown is the DEFINITION MODULE, followed by the accom-
panying IMPLEMENTATION MODULE.
DEFINITION MODULE WeaponSystem;
FROM SimMod IMPORT SimTime;
FROM RandMod IMPORT RandomObj;
FROM GrpMod IMPORT QueueObj;
FROM Maintenance IMPORT OrgMaintObj;




CompObj = OBJECT; FORWARD;




















ASK METHOD Break (IN BrokenParts : BrokenPartsTypeQueue);
(CompObj is informed about an occurred failure within its
ComponentTypeQueue, and passes message and the names of the




(CompObj is informed about an occurred failure within its
WeaponSystemObj , and is told to pause in its aging process
until WeaponSystemObj is up again)
ASK METHOD UpAgain;
(CompObj is told to change to Status=operational
j
END OBJECT;








(ElementObj is told to calculate its next time to failure)
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ASK METHOD Fail;
(ElementObj is asked to fail, and passes message and its own












ASK METHOD DownTime (OUT AverageAvailability : REAL);
(WeaponSystemObj is asked to report SumOfDownTime)
OVERRIDE
ASK METHOD Break (IN BrokenParts : BrokenPartsTypeQueue);
(WeaponSystemObj is informed about an occurred failure within





FROM SimMod IMPORT SimTime;
FROM RandMod IMPORT RandomObj;
FROM GrpMod IMPORT QueueObj;
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FROM Maintenance IMPORT OrgMaintObj , IntMaintObj;






ASK METHOD Break (IN BrokenParts : BrokenPartsTypeQueue);
BEGIN
Status : = broken;
ASK BrokenParts TO Add (SELF);
IF IndentLevel <> System






Tenants := ASK Tenants First();
FOR i:=l TO ASK Tenants numberln
Status := pausing;












TimeToFailure := ASK RandomGenerator Gamma (mean, alpha);
WAIT DURATION TimeToFailure
END WAIT;




Status : = broken;
ASK BrokenParts TO Add (SELF);




ASK METHOD Break (IN BrokenParts : BrokenPartsTypeQueue);
BEGIN
Status : = broken;
StartDownTime := SimTime();
Tenants := ASK Tenants FirstQ;
FOR i: =1 TO ASK Tenants numberln
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Status := pausing;
Tenants := ASK Tenants Next (SELF);
END FOR;
ASK MilitaryUnit TO OrgQueueJob (SELF);
END METHOD;
ASK METHOD DownTime (OUT AverageAvailability : REAL);
BEGIN





APPENDIX E. MODSIM-II-CODE FOR MODULE MAINTENANCE
This appendix contains successfully compiled code for the two objects necessary to
model the behavior of the two studied major Maintenance-Echelon-Levels in the





The first program part shown is the DEFINITION MODULE, followed by the accom-
panying IMPLEMENTATION MODULE.
DEFINITION MODULE Maintenance;
FROM WeaponSystem IMPORT CompObj , WeaponSystemObj;
FROM GrpMod IMPORT QueueObj;





FROM Repair IMPORT RepairObj;
EXPORTTYPE
OrgMaintObj = OBJECT; FORWARD;























ASK METHOD OrgQueueJob (IN WeaponSystem : WeaponSysteraObj );
{OrgMaintObj is told to receive a WeaponSystemObj and to queue
its broken Subsystem into its JobQueue]
ASK METHOD ReportOfldle (IN RepairFacility : RepairObj);
{MaintObj is told to receive a RepairObj and either to assign
it a job or to queue it into its IdleRepairQueue)
TELL METHOD Assign (IN RepairFacility : RepairObj;
IN ComponentToReplace : CompObj);
{MaintObj is asked to assign a CompObj to the asking RepairObj;
both the admistrative delay time ADT2 and the respective
logistic delay time LDTstock / LDTDES / LDTsupply are
considered within this method}
ASK METHOD SendToRepair (IN Component : CompObj);
{MaintObj is asked by the telling RepairObj that a replaced
Com pObj has to be sent to the ResponsiblelntMaintFac)
END OBJECT;
IntMaintObj = OBJECT( OrgMaintObj)
ASK METHOD IntQueueJob (IN Component : CompObj);
{IntMaintObj is told to receive a CompObj and to queue it into its
JobQueue; if queued CompObj is first in JobQueue, initiate its
assignment to the first RepairObj of IdleRepairObjQueue)
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OVERRIDE
TELL METHOD Assign (IN RepairFacility : RepairObj;
IN ComponentToReplace : CompObj);
(MaintObj is asked to assign a CompObj to the asking RepairObj;
both the admistrative delay time ADT3 and the respective logistic




FROM WeaponSystem IMPORT CompObj, WeaponSystemObj;
FROM GrpMod IMPORT QueueObj;
FROM Global IMPORT ADT2 ,ADT3 , LDTstock, LDTDES , LDTsupply
,




FROM Repair IMPORT RepairObj;
OBJECT OrgMaintObj;
ASK METHOD OrgQueueJob (IN WeaponSystem : WeaponSystemObj);
BEGIN
ComponentToReplace := ASK WeaponSystem. BrokenParts Last();
r := ASK IdleRepairFacilities numberln;
IF r=0
ASK JobQueue TO Add (ComponentToReplace);
ELSE
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IdleFacility := ASK IdleRepairFacilitiesRemove( );
TELL SELF TO Assign (IdleFacility, ComponentToReplace);
END IF;
END METHOD;
ASK METHOD ReportOfldle (IN RepairFacility : RepairObj);
BEGIN
j : = ASK JobQueue numberln;
IF j=0
ASK IdleRepairFacilities Add (RepairFacility);
ELSE
ComponentToReplace := ASK JobQueue Reraove();
TELL SELF TO Assign (RepairFacility, ComponentToReplace);
END IF;
END METHOD;
TELL METHOD Assign (IN RepairFacility : RepairObj;
IN ComponentToReplace : CompObj);
BEGIN
TELL RepairFacility TO Fix (ComponentToReplace);
END METHOD;
ASK METHOD SendToRepair (IN Component : CompObj);
BEGIN




ASK METHOD IntQueueJob (IN Component : CompObj);
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BEGIN
ComponentToReplace := ASK Component. BrokenParts Last();
r := ASK IdleRepairFacilities numberln;
IF r=0
ASK JobQueue TO Add (ComponentToReplace);
ELSE
IdleFacility := ASK IdleRepairFacilities Remove();
TELL SELF TO Assign (IdleFacility, ComponentToReplace);
END IF;
END METHOD;
TELL METHOD Assign (IN RepairFacility : RepairObj;
IN ComponentToReplace : CompObj);
BEGIN
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